Citizens All Along: Derivative Citizenship, Unlawful Entry, and the Former Immigration and Nationality Act by Hart, Eamonn
  
2119 
Citizens All Along: Derivative Citizenship, 
Unlawful Entry, and the Former 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
Eamonn Hart† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, at the age of seven, Evaristo Gonzalez entered the 
United States unlawfully.1 His father, a naturalized US citizen, 
filed a petition for an immediate-relative visa, and in 2008, 
Gonzalez became a lawful permanent resident (LPR). In 2011, 
Gonzalez pleaded guilty to a felony.2 Shortly thereafter, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal 
proceedings.3 
For the most part, nothing in this factual scenario is unusu-
al: for noncitizens, conviction of certain crimes results in remov-
ability,4 and in fiscal year 2013, Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) removed approximately 110,000 noncitizens 
convicted of crimes in the United States.5 However, Gonzalez’s 
case was unusual in one respect: he claimed to be a US citizen 
through “derivative citizenship.”6 Derivative citizenship is citi-
zenship acquired when an individual’s parent or parents become 
citizens and certain other conditions are met.7 In Gonzalez’s 
case, the relevant statute was 8 USC § 1432(a)(5), which was 
enacted as § 321(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act8 
 
 † AB 2009, Bowdoin College; JD Candidate 2016, The University of Chicago Law 
School. 
 1 Gonzalez v Holder, 771 F3d 238, 239 (5th Cir 2014). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(A). 
 5 See US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2013 ICE Immigration Re-
movals *1 (DHS), archived at http://perma.cc/YGE8-KW27. 
 6 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 239. 
 7 US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Derivative Citizenship (DHS), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/6CJU-VPXD. 
 8 66 Stat 163, 245 (1952), codified as amended at 8 USC § 1432(a)(5) (1994), re-
pealed by Child Citizenship Act of 2000 § 103(a), Pub L No 106-395, 114 Stat 1631, 1632. 
Although § 1432 was repealed in 2000, it remains operative for individuals like Gonzalez 
who turned eighteen prior to its repeal. See Ashton v Gonzales, 431 F3d 95, 97 (2d Cir 
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(INA) and which allows for derivative citizenship for a child 
when one parent is a naturalized citizen and the child “is resid-
ing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for 
permanent residence at the time of [the parent’s naturalization], 
or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States 
while under the age of eighteen years.”9 
The statute is ambiguous as to whether “lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence” and “reside permanently” mean the 
same thing. “Lawfully admitted for permanent residence” is a 
term defined in the statute as “the status of having been lawful-
ly accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United 
States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration 
laws.”10 “Permanent” and “residence” are also defined,11 but “re-
siding permanently” is not, and a composite definition based on 
the two words does not completely align with the statutory defi-
nition of “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”12 This 
ambiguity has created a split in the circuits, with the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits holding that “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence” and “reside permanently” carry the same meaning 
and the Second Circuit holding that the phrases have independ-
ent meanings.13 
Resolution of this split, however, is not the focus of this 
Comment.14 Instead, this Comment focuses on an unresolved 
question created by the Second Circuit’s reasoning: If LPR sta-
tus is not required for derivative citizenship, can individuals 
who entered the country unlawfully but who otherwise meet the 
derivative citizenship requirements obtain citizenship via opera-
tion of § 1432(a)? The Second Circuit has expressly declined to 
 
2005) (noting that the court must “apply the law in effect when [the petitioner] fulfilled 
the last requirement for derivative citizenship”). 
 9 8 USC § 1432(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 10 8 USC § 1101(a)(20). For further discussion of these and other relevant statutory 
definitions, see Part III.A.1. 
 11 See 8 USC § 1101(a)(31), (33). See also Part III.A.1. 
 12 See Part III.A.I. 
 13 Compare Romero-Ruiz v Mukasey, 538 F3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir 2008) (finding 
identical meanings), and United States v Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir 
2010) (finding identical meanings), with Nwozuzu v Holder, 726 F3d 323, 327 (2d Cir 
2013) (finding independent meanings). 
 14 For a detailed treatment of this circuit split, see Christopher Dutot, Note, Are We 
Removing Citizens? The Contentious Legal Issue Surrounding the Interpretation of the 
Former Derivative Citizenship Statute and Why Lawful Permanent Resident Status Is 
Not Required, 90 U Detroit Mercy L Rev 333, 340–49 (2013) (arguing that the Second 
Circuit’s reading is superior). 
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answer this question,15 and while the Fifth Circuit recently 
found against Gonzalez on the basis of his unlawful entry,16 the 
scope of its decision remains unclear. The Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits have not addressed the question, because their inter-
pretation of the statute moots it.17 
The question is not a trivial one. In 2000, there were 2.6 
million foreign-born children residing in the United States who 
had at least one foreign-born parent.18 For individuals in this set 
who are not yet citizens but have at least one parent who is a 
citizen, a plausible citizenship claim exists provided that they 
meet the other statutory requirements. However, for those in 
this group who entered the country illegally, a citizenship claim 
succeeds only if a court holds that § 1432(a) does not carry an 
implicit lawful entry requirement. 
Further, the question’s importance transcends numbers. 
Courts and administrative bodies make decisions each day that 
affect people’s lives, but few of these decisions are as significant 
as those concerning citizenship status. A finding that an indi-
vidual is not a US citizen may lead to his removal, which could 
lead to disruption of his family and professional life as well as 
return to a country with which he may have little to no connec-
tion.19 Indeed, if an individual’s removal destination is particu-
larly dangerous, finding that individual to be a potentially re-
movable noncitizen may lead to more-severe consequences than 
a criminal conviction and incarceration would: if such an indi-
vidual also faces removal after completing a sentence, he faces 
additional risk to life and limb that would not exist were he 
simply released in the United States. 
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the 
historical background of, and normative justifications for, deriv-
ative citizenship. Part II discusses relevant case law interpret-
ing the INA. Part III argues that, in the absence of a dispositive 
answer through any of the standard modes of analysis, courts 
 
 15 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 330 n 6. 
 16 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 245. 
 17 See Romero-Ruiz, 538 F3d at 1062; Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1326–27. 
 18 United States: Demographics & Social (Migration Policy Institute), archived at 
http://perma.cc/96GK-ZZ6A. 
 19 For illustrations of this phenomenon, see, for example, Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 
325–26; Romero-Ruiz, 538 F3d at 1060. In Nwozuzu, which is discussed extensively in 
Part II.B, the petitioner entered the United States at the age of four. While it is difficult 
to discuss any given individual’s personal feelings about his nationality, it is fair to say 
that Nwozuzu’s connections to his country of birth may have been limited given the age 
at which he left. 
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should interpret the statute not to include a lawful entry re-
quirement, as doing so is preferable given the economic and so-
cial benefits of derivative citizenship. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF, AND NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR, 
DERIVATIVE CITIZENSHIP 
Derivative citizenship has a long history in the United 
States. This Part discusses the development of the concept and 
outlines arguments in favor of granting derivative citizenship. 
Part I.A gives a concise description of US immigration law. Part 
I.B then offers a brief history of derivative citizenship in the 
United States. Finally, Part I.C discusses some normative bene-
fits of derivative citizenship. 
A. The Structure of Modern US Immigration Law 
While this Comment focuses on a narrow provision of law, 
some background on current immigration policy is useful. What 
follows is a general discussion of legal and illegal immigration in 
the United States, as well as a description of some of the im-
portant institutions in the US immigration system. 
1. Legal immigration and unlawful entry. 
To become a “legal” immigrant to the United States, as the 
general public understands the term, an immigrant must first 
obtain LPR status.20 The number of individuals who are eligible 
to obtain this status in a given year is capped at roughly 
675,000, but a higher number of individuals may qualify, as cer-
tain categories of individuals are exempt from these statutory 
caps.21 Importantly for the purposes of this Comment, one set of 
individuals exempt from this limit includes immediate family 
members of US citizens.22 There are also limits on the percent-
age of immigrants that may come from any particular country.23 
A set of policy preferences based on family relationships and 
 
 20 See William A. Kandel, Permanent Legal Immigration to the United States: Poli-
cy Overview *1 (Congressional Research Service, Oct 29, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LJ43-GT67. Note that William A. Kandel’s report uses the term “legal 
permanent resident” as opposed to “lawful permanent resident.” The latter is the appro-
priate term, and it is the one that this Comment uses. For an example of the term’s use 
in the relevant statutory text, see 8 USC § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
 21 See Kandel, Permanent Legal Immigration at *2 (cited in note 20). 
 22 See id. Other categories include refugees and asylum seekers. 
 23 See id at *3. 
06 HART_CMT_SA (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015 2:36 PM 
2015] Citizens All Along 2123 
 
employment skills guides the allocation of the total number of 
immigrant visas, which are required in order to legally enter 
and remain in the United States for the purpose of immigrat-
ing.24 LPR status is generally limited to individuals legally pre-
sent in the United States. That said, there is one limited excep-
tion: under 8 USC § 1229b, the attorney general may cancel the 
removal of an individual and adjust his status to LPR if certain 
conditions are met.25 
If an individual is categorically eligible to enter the United 
States as an LPR and is granted this privilege, he may apply for 
citizenship through the US Customs and Immigration Service. 
Limits exist on the amount of time an applicant may have spent 
out of the country after his initial entry.26 Furthermore, poten-
tial citizens are asked about their understanding of English, 
their knowledge of civics and US history, and their willingness 
to perform military or civilian service.27 
Of course, lawful entry to the country followed by LPR sta-
tus and eventual citizenship is not the only path that individu-
als can take to a life in the United States. Many individuals en-
ter the country outside the bounds of the law. As of 2012, there 
were 11.4 million immigrants living in the United States with-
out authorization.28 There are many ways in which immigration 
law might classify a person’s presence as unauthorized. For ex-
ample, an individual could be in the country on a time-limited 
visa (such as a student F-1 visa29) and stay beyond its expira-
tion. In an example that is more relevant to this Comment, one 
could enter the country without inspection at the border and 
simply remain in the United States until discovered by immigra-
tion authorities. When discovered, an individual is likely to be-
come involved with the immigration-enforcement system. 
 
 24 See id at *3. 
 25 8 USC § 1229b(b)(1). These conditions are extended physical presence, good mor-
al character, lack of convictions for certain offenses, and the presence of exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship in the event of removal. 8 USC § 1229b(b)(1). 
 26 See US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Naturalization Eligibility Work-
sheet Instructions *1 (DHS, June 15, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/P82P-GST2. 
 27 See id at *3–4. 
 28 Bryan Baker and Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Popu-
lation Residing in the United States: January 2012 *2 (DHS, Mar 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/H9JP-YZR8. 
 29 For more information about student visas, see generally Bureau of Consular Affairs, 
Student Visa: Overview (Department of State), archived at http://perma.cc/X3WM-RM9A. 
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2. Institutions in immigration enforcement. 
Several institutions are involved in immigration enforce-
ment in ways that are highly relevant to this Comment. To un-
derstand them, consider the following hypothetical: An immi-
grant illegally enters the country and is subsequently 
discovered. Initially, he is likely to go before an immigration 
judge in the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). 
The EOIR is a branch of the DOJ, and it handles all initial re-
moval proceedings initiated by the DHS.30 At a hearing, an im-
migration judge considers arguments presented by both the 
Government and the individual, and the judge then determines 
whether the individual should be removed.31 
Either party may appeal the immigration judge’s decision to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). This is a special tribu-
nal within the EOIR whose role is to review the decisions of im-
migration judges.32 The BIA chooses whether to publish any giv-
en decision; published decisions are precedential, but unpublished 
opinions are not.33 While the EOIR sometimes engages in rule-
making,34 the BIA is solely an appellate body, as the regulations 
providing for its existence do not give it broad regulatory pow-
er.35 If an individual is dissatisfied with the result he obtains 
from the BIA, he may appeal to the court of appeals for the rele-
vant geographic circuit.36 
B. The History of Derivative Citizenship in the United States 
Derivative citizenship law has existed in the United States 
since 1790. This Section considers early American law regarding 
derivative citizenship, addresses the changes that occurred in 
1952 (which remained in place for several decades), and, finally, 
turns to the present state of derivative citizenship law in light of 
statutory amendments made in 2000. While the law has 
changed over time, US immigration policy has consistently con-
tained some form of derivative citizenship law. 
 
 30 See Executive Office for Immigration Review, EOIR at a Glance (DOJ, Sept 9, 
2010), archived at http://perma.cc/2KMR-33GV.  
 31 See id. 
 32 See Board of Immigration Appeals, Practice Manual *1 (DOJ, July 27, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/CP33-ZN5F.  
 33 Id at *8–9. 
 34 See id at *137. 
 35 See 8 CFR § 1003.1(b) (defining the BIA’s appellate jurisdiction). 
 36 See note 81. 
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1. Early developments. 
While the basic concept of derivative citizenship has re-
mained constant throughout history, the requirements for de-
rivative citizenship have varied significantly.37 Congress passed 
the first statute granting derivative citizenship in 1790 to pro-
vide citizenship for foreign-born children of US citizens.38 
Subsequently, derivative citizenship law went through nu-
merous iterations.39 Among these was a prohibition on citizen-
ship for any person convicted of fighting on behalf of Great Britain 
during the American Revolution, as well as a change allowing 
derivative citizenship to obtain even when the conditions prece-
dent were not met at birth.40 An amendment in 1855 contained a 
more significant change: it restricted derivative citizenship such 
that it could pass only from fathers to their children.41 Subse-
quent changes in 1934 and 1940 made the requirements still 
more stringent by including a longer residency requirement for 
both children and parents as well as a loyalty oath.42 
2. The INA. 
In 1952, Congress passed the INA.43 The INA was a com-
prehensive overhaul of the US immigration system: it removed 
certain exclusions, modified the quota system, and authorized 
skill-based visas, among other things.44 It also contained a de-
rivative citizenship provision, later codified at § 1432(a), which 
provided that a foreign-born child of noncitizen parents could 
become a US citizen “upon fulfillment of the following condi-
tions”: 
 
 37 See Michael G. McFarland, Note, Derivative Citizenship: Its History, Constitu-
tional Foundation, and Constitutional Limitations, 63 NYU Ann Surv Am L 467, 477–83 
(2008) (describing the historical development of derivative citizenship law in the United 
States). 
 38 See Act of Mar 26, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat 103, 104. 
 39 See McFarland, Note, 63 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 477–82 (cited in note 37). 
 40 See id at 479–80. 
 41 See Act of Feb 10, 1855 § 1, 10 Stat 604, 604; McFarland, Note, 63 NYU Ann 
Surv Am L at 479 (cited in note 37). 
 42 See McFarland, Note, 63 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 481–82 (cited in note 37). 
 43 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified as amended in various sections of Title 8. 
 44 See Revising the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, 
HR Rep No 82-1365, 82d Cong, 2d Sess 28–30 (1952), reprinted in 1952 USCCAN 1653, 
1679–81. 
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(1) [t]he naturalization of both parents; or  
(2) [t]he naturalization of the surviving parent if one of the 
parents is deceased; or  
(3) [t]he naturalization of the parent having legal custody of 
the child [under specified conditions]; and if  
(4) [s]uch naturalization takes place while such child is un-
der the age of sixteen years; and  
(5) [s]uch child is residing in the United States pursuant to 
a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of 
the naturalization of the parent last naturalized under . . . 
this subsection, or thereafter begins to reside permanently 
in the United States while under the age of sixteen years.45 
Subsequent legislation changed the age threshold from six-
teen to eighteen and expanded the eligibility of adopted chil-
dren,46 but this standard for derivative citizenship otherwise 
remained in place until 2000. 
3. The Child Citizenship Act of 2000.47 
In 2000, Congress again amended the derivative citizenship 
statute, this time with a substantive revision. The Child Citi-
zenship Act of 2000 (CCA) repealed § 143248—the provision con-
taining the “reside permanently” language at issue in this 
Comment—and amended 8 USC § 1431 to read as follows: 
(a) A child born outside of the United States automatically 
becomes a citizen of the United States when all of the fol-
lowing conditions have been fulfilled:  
(1) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the 
United States, whether by birth or naturalization.  
(2) The child is under the age of eighteen years.  
(3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal 
and physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a 
lawful admission for permanent residence.49 
 
 45 INA § 321(a), 66 Stat at 245, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1432(a) (1994). 
 46 See Act of Oct 5, 1978 § 5, Pub L No 95-417, 92 Stat 917, 918, codified as amend-
ed at 8 USC § 1432 (1994). 
 47 Pub L No 106-395, 114 Stat 1631, codified as amended in various sections of Title 8. 
 48 CCA § 103(a), 114 Stat at 1632. 
 49 CCA § 101(a), 114 Stat at 1631, codified at 8 USC § 1431(a). 
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Congress intended the CCA to ease the path to citizenship 
for adopted children who are born abroad.50 The statute creates 
a single set of conditions for all children born outside the United 
States, regardless of whether they are adopted, and it provides a 
means for adopted children to receive citizenship automatical-
ly.51 By repealing § 1432, the CCA retained the language requir-
ing lawful admission for permanent residence, but it did not 
keep the “reside permanently” language.52 It is not clear why 
Congress chose to remove this language; the legislative history 
does not speak to the issue. 
C. The Normative Justifications for Derivative Citizenship 
Traditionally, citizenship is created via two means: jus soli 
and jus sanguinis—terms that translate to “right of birthplace” 
and “right of blood,” respectively.53 Jus soli citizenship is derived 
by birth location, while jus sanguinis citizenship is derived by 
virtue of an individual’s familial relationships. In particular, the 
principles underlying the second form provide normative justifi-
cations for derivative citizenship. An understanding of these 
normative considerations aids the understanding of how one 
could read the INA to allow for derivative citizenship even in the 
event of unlawful entry. Justifications include promoting family 
unity and reducing the prevalence of stateless individuals.54 
1. Derivative citizenship promotes family unity. 
Family unity is an important objective of US immigration 
law,55 and derivative citizenship promotes this objective. Profes-
sor David Thronson has written on the interaction of immigra-
tion and family law, noting that one out of every ten immigrant 
 
 50 See Adopted Orphans Citizenship Act, HR Rep No 106-852, 106th Cong, 2d Sess 
3–5 (2000) (noting that the bill, which would ultimately become the CCA, was designed 
to provide automatic citizenship to adopted children born outside the United States). 
 51 See id at 2. 
 52 See CCA § 101(a), 114 Stat at 1631, codified at 8 USC § 1431. 
 53 See McFarland, Note, 63 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 471 (cited in note 37). 
 54 For a discussion of the benefits of derivative citizenship, see id at 474–77. For a 
discussion of the costs of derivative citizenship, see id at 474 n 35 (discussing some costs, 
which largely involve the fact that citizens are often entitled to various state benefits, as 
well as the fact that derivative citizenship increases the pool of individuals eligible for 
such benefits and thus increases costs).  
 55 See Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, 80 U Chi L 
Rev 289, 292–93 (2013) (discussing the importance of family unity to US immigration 
law and policy). 
06 HART_CMT_SA (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015 2:36 PM 
2128  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:2119 
   
children lives in a “mixed-status” family in which immediate fam-
ily members have different immigration statuses.56 Furthermore, 
he has observed that a significant number of undocumented 
immigrants are children, some of whom have a parent who is a 
citizen.57 
Derivative citizenship reduces the number of mixed-status 
families, yielding both normative and economic benefits. Norma-
tively, it is a common view that keeping families united when 
possible is a positive thing.58 Indeed, US immigration policy has 
long held family unity as a goal. For example, the House report 
accompanying the INA spoke of “the well-established policy of 
maintaining the family unit.”59 Furthermore, Representative 
James Dolliver spoke in support of the bill’s derivative citizen-
ship provisions on the ground that they would reduce the num-
ber of family-unification private bills used for relief in individual 
situations.60 
Dolliver’s remarks also speak to an economic justification 
for derivative citizenship: it reduces the resources that govern-
ment institutions spend to address the concerns of mixed-status 
families. As Dolliver noted, prior to the INA, Congress was fre-
quently forced to pass private bills for relief.61 The private bill 
procedure is a convoluted one; procedural and political hurdles 
make it an impractical avenue for addressing these issues on 
any scale larger than that of the individual case.62 In a similar 
vein, consider Thronson’s arguments about overlap between 
immigration and family law. In theory, immigration judges and 
family court judges have very different competencies. However, 
Thronson suggests that our current immigration system often 
intertwines immigration law with family law, and it forces 
courts to make decisions relying on bodies of law outside their 
 
 56 David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as 
Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 Hastings L J 453, 454 (2008). 
 57 Id at 454–55 & n 13. 
 58 See Posner, 80 U Chi L Rev at 292–93 (cited in note 55).  
 59 HR Rep No 82-1365 at 39 (cited in note 44). 
 60 See Revision of Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, HR 
5678, 82d Cong, 2d Sess, in 98 Cong Rec 4308 (Apr 23, 1952) (statement of Rep Dolliver). 
 61 See id (discussing the previous practice of introducing private bills to provide cit-
izenship to individual children when a child was born or adopted abroad). 
 62 See Kati L. Griffith, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private Immigra-
tion Bills and Deportable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 Georgetown Immig L J 273, 
294–302 (2004) (discussing procedural difficulties and political barriers to the use of pri-
vate bills in the immigration context). 
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traditional areas of expertise.63 Derivative citizenship makes it 
easier for all family members to have the same status, which in 
turn likely results in fewer cases with serious family law consid-
erations moving into immigration courts. 
2. Derivative citizenship reduces the number of stateless 
individuals. 
Statelessness is a condition that occurs when an individual 
lacks a specific nationality.64 This condition may seem strange to 
many Americans, who are accustomed to birthright (jus soli) cit-
izenship. However, not all nations provide birthright citizenship. 
If an individual does not acquire nationality at birth and his fa-
milial relationships do not provide for jus sanguinis citizenship, 
he can be said to be stateless. 
Statelessness is normatively undesirable. Individuals with-
out a nationality cannot rely on the protection of a particular 
state. Stateless individuals often lack “birth registration, identi-
ty documentation, education, health care, legal employment, 
property ownership, political participation and freedom of 
movement.”65 Stateless persons are also at a higher risk of be-
coming victims of human trafficking.66 Scholars have even ar-
gued that stateless individuals suffer more harms than aliens 
abroad, suggesting that, as far as possible, statelessness “should 
. . . be abolished.”67 
Nationality also benefits states. For one thing, it makes it 
easier as an administrative matter for families to travel togeth-
er.68 States want to offer security to their citizens concerning 
overseas travel, and nationality essentially places a stamp on 
individuals by indicating that they fall under that state’s protec-
tion.69 Nationality also ensures that foreign-born children of citi-
zens will obtain the rights and privileges of citizenship upon 
 
 63 Thronson, 59 Hastings L J at 456–59 (cited in note 56). 
 64 See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen, Nationality 
and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, 83 Yale L J 900, 
902 (1974) (defining the “stateless person” as someone “without formal membership in 
any body politic”). 
 65 Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 75, 92 (2011), quoting Di-
vision of International Protection, UNHCR Action to Address Statelessness: A Strategy 
Note *4 (UNHCR, Mar 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/F4BA-7TVT. 
 66 See Milbrandt, 20 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L at 92 (cited in note 65). 
 67 McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, 83 Yale L J at 902, 905 (cited in note 64). 
 68 See McFarland, Note, 63 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 474 (cited in note 37). 
 69 See McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, 83 Yale L J at 907 (cited in note 64). 
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their return and will thus desire to stay in and contribute to the 
country granting nationality.70 
Furthermore, a state may view assimilation as a positive 
thing for immigrants.71 In the case of multiple generations of 
immigrants, the older generation may have less incentive to as-
similate culturally. Given the short-term effects of this lack of 
assimilation, the state may not be especially concerned about 
this. However, assimilation of younger immigrant generations 
presents a concern because the younger generations will likely 
be present in the host country for longer periods of time. If 
members of this generation are stateless, and thus do not re-
ceive the full benefits and protections of membership in the host 
country’s citizenry, they may be less likely to assimilate. Indeed, 
citizenship has been shown to promote assimilation. For exam-
ple, a study published by the Center for American Progress 
found that in the United States, second-generation Latinos who 
had citizenship by birth were more likely to assimilate, as 
measured by factors such as English-language attainment and 
school completion.72 
Derivative citizenship can help solve the statelessness prob-
lem. A strong derivative citizenship regime prevents the prob-
lems that occur when parents who are citizens of a jus soli coun-
try have children outside its borders in a jus sanguinis regime. 
Derivative citizenship, in that case, reduces the number of state-
less individuals. 
II.  DERIVATIVE CITIZENSHIP AND THE LAWFUL ENTRY 
REQUIREMENT 
Several cases are instructive on the issue of whether 
§ 1432(a) contains an implicit lawful entry requirement. The 
cases speak primarily to whether “lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence” and “reside permanently” have the same mean-
ing or independent meanings. If they have the same meaning, 
then the statute requires lawful admission for permanent resi-
 
 70 See McFarland, Note, 63 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 474–75 (cited in note 37). 
 71 See Posner, 80 U Chi L Rev at 293 (cited in note 55) (suggesting that “the em-
phasis on family reunification in US immigration law accounts for the high level of 
assimilation of immigrants, which contrasts favorably to the experiences in other coun-
tries”). See also id at 297 (describing the “good type of immigrant” as one with the char-
acteristic of “assimilability,” among others). 
 72 Dowell Myers and John Pitkin, Assimilation Today: New Evidence Shows the 
Latest Immigrants to America Are Following in Our History’s Footsteps *19–20 (Center 
for American Progress, Sept 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/P542-VLR8.  
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dence as a precondition of obtaining derivative citizenship. If 
they have different meanings, then the presence of the disjunc-
tive “or” suggests that “reside permanently” stands as an inde-
pendent path to meeting the statutory requirements for deriva-
tive citizenship. This distinction raises a subsidiary question, 
which serves as the focus of this Comment: If the independent-
meaning interpretation is correct, is lawful entry implicitly re-
quired under the “reside permanently” prong, or may an unlaw-
ful entrant who meets the other statutory requirements gain cit-
izenship under § 1432? 
To address this question, one must first understand appel-
late court decisions confronting whether the “lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence” and “reside permanently” require-
ments are independent. This Part proceeds in three sections. 
The first considers the identical-meaning interpretation and de-
scribes the reasoning that led the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
to adopt it. The second considers the independent-meaning in-
terpretation, which has been adopted by the Second Circuit. The 
final Section considers the Fifth Circuit’s interaction with the is-
sue: although the court has not directly confronted the question 
of unlawful entry, it has heard a case implicating this question. 
A. The Identical-Meaning Interpretation 
Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits interpret the second 
clause of § 1432(a)(5) as having identical meaning to the LPR 
clause; that is, they hold that one who does not have LPR status 
cannot gain citizenship under this statute by merely “resid[ing] 
permanently in the United States.”73 The Ninth Circuit was the 
first to approach the issue, in the 2008 case of Romero-Ruiz v 
Mukasey,74 and the Eleventh Circuit subsequently addressed the 
problem in United States v Forey-Quintero.75 
1. The Ninth Circuit adopts the identical-meaning view. 
The petitioner in Romero-Ruiz entered the United States 
unlawfully at the age of four.76 While he was still under eighteen 
years of age, his mother was naturalized, and he filed an appli-
 
 73 8 USC § 1432(a)(5) (1994). 
 74 538 F3d 1057 (9th Cir 2008). 
 75 626 F3d 1323 (11th Cir 2010). 
 76 Romero-Ruiz, 538 F3d at 1060. 
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cation for adjustment of status shortly thereafter.77 He later left 
the country temporarily and claimed citizenship upon his re-
turn. He was allowed entry but was subsequently adjudged to be 
removable for having made a false claim to citizenship.78 In his 
removal proceedings, he defended on the ground that he was a 
citizen through derivative citizenship; the BIA, however, rejected 
this claim in an unpublished opinion.79 The BIA noted that 
§ 1432(a)(5) attaches the LPR requirement to those “residing in 
the United States . . . at the time of the naturalization of the 
parent.”80 As such, it concluded that because Romero-Ruiz was 
residing in the United States at the time of his mother’s natural-
ization, LPR status was required for him to successfully claim 
derivative citizenship. Romero-Ruiz petitioned the Ninth Circuit 
for review of the BIA decision.81 
In a short opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s de-
cision. The court noted: “It is a well-established principle of 
statutory construction that legislative enactments should not be 
construed to render their provisions mere surplusage.”82 Observ-
ing that “reside permanently” was preceded by “thereafter be-
gins” in the statute, the Court found that the reading best avoid-
ing surplusage was one that viewed the “reside permanently” 
language as merely modifying the timing of the residence re-
quirement, not its substance.83 The court essentially suggested 
that because “residing permanently” was a necessary condition 
of LPR status, reading the two terms independently would ren-
der the LPR-status clause superfluous, and that the terms 
should be read to have identical meanings.84 The court therefore 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See In re Romero-Ruiz, 2005 WL 698289, *2–3 (BIA). Most of the BIA’s decisions, 
including In re Romero-Ruiz, are unpublished and nonprecedential. Only the few that are 
selected for publication are considered precedential. See note 33 and accompanying text. 
 80 In re Romero-Ruiz, 2005 WL 698289 at *2, quoting 8 USC § 1432(a)(5) (1994). 
 81 Romero-Ruiz, 538 F3d at 1060–61. The courts of appeals have jurisdiction over 
final orders of removal. An individual seeking to reverse a BIA removal decision peti-
tions directly to the court of appeals, rather than filing in a federal district court. See 8 
USC § 1252(b)(2) (“The petition for review shall be filed with the court of appeals for the 
judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings.”). While dis-
trict courts occasionally have a role to play if appellate courts remand for factual deter-
minations, district courts are rarely in a position to make significant legal conclusions 
concerning removal orders. 
 82 Romero-Ruiz, 538 F3d at 1062 (quotation marks omitted). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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denied Romero-Ruiz’s petition for review, leaving the order for 
removal in place.85 
2. The Eleventh Circuit also adopts the identical-meaning 
view. 
The Eleventh Circuit considered derivative citizenship un-
der § 1432(a) in Forey-Quintero. The defendant in that case was 
convicted of being a previously removed alien found in the United 
States without permission to reenter.86 The defendant had en-
tered the United States legally (though not with LPR status) at 
a young age.87 Subsequently, his mother filed a Petition for Alien 
Relative.88 The defendant would have been eligible for LPR sta-
tus when a visa became available.89 However, he did not achieve 
this status while he was under the age of eighteen.90 After gain-
ing LPR status at the age of nineteen, he committed an aggra-
vated felony, was removed from the country, and unlawfully at-
tempted to reenter.91 He was charged with and convicted of 
illegal reentry, and he was sentenced to forty-six months’ impris-
onment.92 He subsequently appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.93 
 
 85 Id at 1064. 
 86 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1324. Such illegal reentry is criminalized. 8 USC 
§ 1326(a)–(b). 
 87 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1325. Forey-Quintero entered the United States with 
a border-crossing card. Id. A border-crossing card is a document that allows Mexican na-
tionals to enter the United States on a short-term basis. See Bureau of Consular Affairs, 
Border Crossing Card (Department of State), archived at http://perma.cc/LNS3-W8EF. 
 88 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1325. A Petition for Alien Relative, also known as 
Form I-130, is a petition to establish a relationship between two persons, one of whom is 
a citizen or has LPR status. The citizen or LPR files the petition on behalf of an alien 
relative. The grant of the petition does not itself grant a visa or other right, but it legally 
establishes the relationship necessary for the alien relative to file Form I-485 (“Applica-
tion to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status”) and to have a visa approved 
without waiting for a visa number. See generally US Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices, Instructions for Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative (DHS, Mar 23, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/8TBE-93PX; US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Instruc-
tions for I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (DHS, June 
20, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5DBB-USEW.  
 89 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1325. The INA establishes a system to create numer-
ical limits on issuable visas. The attorney general is empowered to do this, subject to a 
statutory framework setting out the means of calculating the limits. See 8 USC § 1153. 
 90 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1325. 
 91 Brief for Appellee, United States v Forey-Quintero, Docket No 09-15330, *5 (11th 
Cir filed Feb 22, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 783602). 
 92 See Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v Forey-Quintero, Criminal Ac-
tion No 08-0353, *2 (ND Ga filed Oct 19, 2009). 
 93 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1324–25. 
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The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the 
two clauses in § 1432(a)(5) have identical meanings. The deci-
sion came after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Romero-Ruiz and 
the BIA’s decision in Matter of Nwozuzu,94 and the court used 
reasoning from both of these opinions to reach its conclusion. It 
followed the logic of the BIA’s opinion in Matter of Nwozuzu, 
which interpreted “reside permanently” to include an implicit 
requirement that the residence was lawful, given the “realities 
of the immigration laws.”95 The Eleventh Circuit expounded on 
this, stating that “a dwelling place cannot be permanent under 
the immigration laws if it is unauthorized.”96 Essentially, the 
court reasoned that one’s residence cannot conceivably be con-
sidered permanent if one faces an ongoing possibility of removal. 
The court also adopted the logic of Romero-Ruiz that an alterna-
tive interpretation would result in surplusage.97 The court stated 
that an interpretation favoring Forey-Quintero would essential-
ly reward those who had taken minimal steps to legally reside in 
the United States.98 Considering all of these factors, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed Forey-Quintero’s conviction.99 Notably, neither 
Forey-Quintero nor Romero-Ruiz considered the lawful entry ques-
tion, likely because their resolution of the identical/independent-
meaning issue mooted the question. In other words, because 
both courts assumed that lawful admission for permanent resi-
dence was required, and because such admission necessarily ex-
cludes illegal entrants, there was no need to resolve the question 
whether unlawful entrants could claim the statute’s protection. 
B. The Independent-Meaning View and the Question of Lawful 
Entry 
In a recent case, the Second Circuit departed from the Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuits, holding that the two clauses in 
§ 1432(a)(5) should be read to have independent meanings. Un-
der this interpretation, one need not have formal LPR status to 
gain the statute’s protection. In reaching this conclusion, the 
 
 94 24 I&N Dec 609 (BIA 2008). For an extensive discussion of this case, see 
Part II.B.  
 95 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1327, quoting Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec at 613. 
 96 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1327 (quotation marks omitted). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
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court acknowledged the question of lawful entry but declined to 
answer it. 
1. The Second Circuit holds that the two clauses of 
§ 1432(a)(5) have independent meanings. 
In the case of Nwozuzu v Holder,100 the Second Circuit con-
sidered whether the clauses in § 1432(a)(5) have identical or 
independent meanings. The petitioner in that case was admitted 
to the United States as a child of an individual admitted as a 
nonimmigrant student. However, the petitioner was not granted 
LPR status until he was twenty-one years old.101 When he was 
subsequently placed in removal proceedings after a firearms 
conviction,102 he argued that he had “resided permanently” in 
the United States and therefore was a citizen, as he had met the 
other requirements of § 1432(a).103 
The immigration judge agreed with Nwozuzu, but the DHS 
appealed to the BIA. In what appears to be its only precedential 
decision concerning this issue,104 the BIA reversed. It first found 
that the term “reside permanently” was ambiguous and that 
both Nwozuzu and the Government offered plausible readings.105 
However, it held that, considered in the context of the defini-
tions provided in the INA, that term excluded statuses other 
than “lawful permanent residence.” The BIA wrote: 
A dwelling place . . . cannot be “permanent” . . . under the 
immigration laws if it is unauthorized. An alien who en-
tered this country illegally or remains without authorization 
might maintain a home or residence here, but there is no 
guarantee that he or she will be able to do so for any length 
of time. The concept of “residing permanently” therefore in-
cludes an implied requirement that the residence be law-
ful.106 
 
 100 726 F3d 323 (2d Cir 2013). The petitioner in Nwozuzu had his case heard by 
several different bodies at different times. In this Comment, “Matter of Nwozuzu” re-
fers to the precedential BIA decision in 2008. “In re Nwozuzu” refers to a subsequent, 
unpublished, nonprecedential BIA decision in 2009. “Nwozuzu v Holder” (or simply 
“Nwozuzu”) refers to the petitioner’s 2013 appeal to the Second Circuit. 
 101 Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec at 609. 
 102 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 326. 
 103 Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec at 610. 
 104 The issue was also discussed in In re Romero-Ruiz, which was nonprecedential. 
See In re Romero-Ruiz, 2005 WL 698289 at *2. 
 105 See Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec at 612–15. 
 106 Id at 613 (citation omitted). 
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Notably, the BIA did not adopt the Ninth Circuit’s view that 
the issue is merely temporal. That is, it did not adopt the view 
that “thereafter begins to reside permanently” simply means 
that an individual may gain derivative citizenship through 
§ 1432(a) even if he did not have LPR status at the time of his 
parent’s naturalization, as long he gained LPR status after the 
naturalization.107 The BIA opinion did not state a view on the 
temporality issue, instead simply concluding that there were no 
adequate means of demonstrating that one “resides permanently” 
absent LPR status.108 
On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed. Engaging in a 
Chevron analysis,109 the court first considered “whether Con-
gress [had] directly spoken to the . . . issue.”110 The court made 
several observations suggesting that Congress intended the 
clauses in § 1432(a)(5) to have independent meanings. First, it 
noted that the two clauses use plainly different terms (“lawful 
admission for permanent residence” and “reside permanently”), 
leading to a presumption that Congress intended separate 
meanings.111 The court further noted that the term “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence” was a term of art defined in 
the statute, whereas “reside permanently” was not.112 
The court also looked to other sections of the INA to distin-
guish between the phrases. For example, the court observed that 
§ 322 of the INA allowed for a citizenship certificate when “the 
child [was] residing permanently in the United States . . . pursu-
ant to a lawful admission for permanent residence.”113 It pointed 
to other pieces of the INA that used the phrases differently as 
well. For example, § 327 dealt with individuals seeking to regain 
citizenship after losing it as a result of fighting for another coun-
 
 107 Recall that the Ninth Circuit held in Romero-Ruiz that “the phrase ‘or thereafter 
begins to reside permanently’ alters only the timing of the residence requirement.” 
Romero-Ruiz, 538 F3d at 1062 (emphasis in original). 
 108 Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec at 615. 
 109 See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 
US 837 (1984). Chevron analysis determines whether agencies receive deference in their 
interpretations of law. Under Chevron, courts first ask “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue”; then, if the answer is no, courts ask whether the 
agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id at 842–43. 
 110 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 327, quoting Chevron, 467 US at 842. 
 111 See Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 327, citing Immigration and Nationalization Service v 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 432 (1987). 
 112 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 327–28. Note, however, that “reside” and “permanent” are 
defined in the INA. See Part III.A.1. 
 113 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 328 (brackets and emphasis in original), quoting 8 USC 
§ 1433(a)(5)(A) (1994). 
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try during World War II, and it gave “lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence” and “reside permanently” independent 
meanings.114 Furthermore, the court relied heavily on the inter-
pretive canon against surplusage, noting that “[i]f one could only 
reside permanently in the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident, then the phrase ‘pursuant to a lawful admission for 
permanent residence’ would have been superfluous.”115 Consider-
ing Congress’s choice to define one phrase as a term of art, the 
various distinct uses of the terms throughout the INA, and the 
canon against surplusage, the court found that the two phrases 
have independent meanings. 
Finding no ambiguity on the face of the text, the court fur-
ther supported its conclusion by considering the legislative his-
tory of the statute. Finding preservation of family unity to be a 
paramount goal of Congress, it noted that a reading requiring 
LPR status could create additional burdens for children living 
abroad at the time of their parents’ naturalization.116 While 
these children would be eligible for derivative citizenship, LPR 
status was, in the court’s view, a needless procedural formality 
that could jeopardize the children’s ability to gain citizenship 
through their parents.117 The court also noted that many sub-
groups are allowed to reside permanently in the United States 
without LPR status—for example, crewmen on fishing vessels.118 
Considering these factors, the Second Circuit held that even if the 
statute was ambiguous, the BIA’s reading was unreasonable.119 
Furthermore, the court noted that, linguistic and interpre-
tive exercises notwithstanding, it had already confronted the is-
sue in Ashton v Gonzales.120 That case addressed whether a sub-
jective intent to reside permanently was sufficient to meet the 
requirements of § 1432(a) when an individual has neither begun 
to reside permanently in the United States nor applied for LPR 
status.121 The court in Ashton concluded that this subjective in-
 
 114 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 328, citing 8 USC § 1438(b)(2). 
 115 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 328 (emphasis in original). 
 116 Id at 332.  
 117 Id at 331–32. 
 118 Id at 333. 
 119 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 333. Note that this holding somewhat blurs the Chevron 
inquiry. While the court could have stopped its analysis once it found the statute’s text 
unambiguous (an inquiry appropriate at step one of Chevron), it also held the interpreta-
tion “unreasonable,” which more closely resembles step two of Chevron. 
 120 431 F3d 95 (2d Cir 2005). See also Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 328. 
 121 Ashton, 431 F3d at 98. 
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tent was insufficient, ruling against the petitioner.122 However, 
while it had not explicitly reached the question whether “lawful-
ly admitted for permanent residence” and “reside permanently” 
had meanings independent of each other, the Ashton court had 
declined to rule out the possibility that “some lesser official ob-
jective manifestation” than LPR status could satisfy § 1432(a).123 
What, exactly, “some lesser official objective manifestation” 
means remains a mystery. In Nwozuzu, the Second Circuit 
clearly stated that an application for LPR status will suffice 
(even if the status itself was not required).124 It also clearly stat-
ed that the behavior of relatives, while perhaps relevant, will 
not be dispositive; applications for LPR status or citizenship by 
children or parents of the individual in question will not consti-
tute an “objective and official manifestation” for that individu-
al.125 The court further clarified that this phrase cannot require 
purely subjective intent on the part of the individual—that is, an 
individual’s testimony stating intent to reside permanently 
would be insufficient.126 Thus, questions remain open: Just how 
“official” must an official manifestation be? For example, is ap-
plying for a state benefit an objective manifestation of intent to 
reside permanently? Is purchasing a home? Courts may soon be 
forced to provide more-definite rules on this point, particularly if 
additional circuits adopt the holding of Nwozuzu. Further, if 
courts do adopt this holding, they will likely have to confront an 
issue that the Second Circuit acknowledged but did not resolve: 
whether there is a lawful entry requirement to receiving deriva-
tive citizenship. 
2. The Second Circuit acknowledges the question of lawful 
entry. 
The Second Circuit’s opinion also spoke in passing to the 
question of lawful entry. In a footnote, the court wrote: “Nwozuzu 
‘was admitted legally into the United States . . . and until he 
was convicted . . . he did not belong to a class of persons categor-
 
 122 Id at 99. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 334. 
 125 Id. The court found the fact that Nwozuzu’s relatives were present in the United 
States and had been naturalized to be relevant, though not dispositive. It reached this 
conclusion by noting that the purpose of the statute was, in part, to achieve family unity, 
and thus that the behavior of family members could support—though not by itself pro-
vide for—a claim of objective official manifestation to reside permanently. Id at 332–34. 
 126 See id at 328–29, citing Ashton, 431 F3d at 99. 
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ically forbidden from immigrating.’ Therefore, we need not con-
sider whether the ‘reside permanently’ clause . . . carries an im-
plicit ‘lawful entry’ requirement.”127 
While the court did not explicitly consider whether the stat-
ute permits a grant of citizenship to an unlawful entrant, the 
standard that it adopted does not preclude this result. As dis-
cussed in Part II.B.1, the court in Nwozuzu adopted the lan-
guage of Ashton, stating that “objective official manifestation” of 
intent to reside permanently is all that § 1432(a) requires.128 
This requirement says nothing about entry requirements. If any 
of the previously discussed hypotheticals (such as an application 
for state benefits or the purchase of a home) would in fact suf-
fice, then the court’s definition of “reside permanently” could 
cover an individual who entered the United States unlawfully. 
C. The Fifth Circuit Approach and the Archaic Case Law 
Underlying It 
The Fifth Circuit has not formally weighed in on the ques-
tion whether the two clauses of § 1432(a)(5) have identical or in-
dependent meanings, but it has spoken, albeit narrowly, about 
lawful entry. In Gonzalez v Holder,129 the court concluded—
without resolving the categorical question—that the petitioner 
was barred from § 1432(a) derivative citizenship due to his un-
lawful entry into the country.130 Gonzalez marks the first and on-
ly time to date that a federal court of appeals has taken a posi-
tion on the question of lawful entry. 
1. The Gonzalez case. 
As noted in the Introduction, the petitioner in Gonzalez en-
tered the country unlawfully at the age of seven. His father was 
naturalized seven years later and filed a petition for an immediate-
relative visa on the petitioner’s behalf.131 However, the petitioner 
 
 127 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 330 n 6, quoting Ashton, 431 F3d at 99. 
 128 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 333. 
 129 771 F3d 238 (5th Cir 2014). 
 130 Id at 245. 
 131 Id at 239. A US citizen may file a petition for a visa on behalf of a child, spouse, 
or parent in order for the latter to receive a green card. This is known as an “immediate 
relative” visa or a “Petition for Alien Relative.” See note 88. There are some additional 
restrictions based on age and marital status, but the measure allows for a fast-track 
green card for relatives of citizens. Persons with LPR status may also file a petition on 
behalf of their relatives, though their means to do so are more limited. See generally 
USCIS, Instructions for Form I-130 (cited in note 88). 
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did not gain LPR status until he was twenty-three years old.132 
Prior to this case, the Fifth Circuit had not definitively spoken 
to the scope of § 1432(a).133 
The court evaluated the various approaches to interpreting 
§ 1432(a)(5), including the Ninth, Eleventh, and Second Circuits’ 
approaches, as well as the BIA’s previous holdings.134 Ultimate-
ly, it did not settle on an answer to the question whether the 
independent-meaning view or the identical-meaning view was 
correct. The court instead concluded that Gonzalez’s illegal en-
try, coupled with his failure to ensure lawful presence prior to 
his eighteenth birthday, was fatal to his claim.135 
It is worth examining the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in this 
case closely. The court conceded that the text of the statute did 
not speak clearly to the question whether lawful presence in the 
country was required.136 Nonetheless, the court relied heavily on 
Gonzalez’s illegal entry to find that he did not qualify for deriva-
tive citizenship. The court cited its previous decision in United 
States v Elrawy137 for the proposition that an immigrant whose 
status has become unlawful—either via illegal entry or by over-
staying a visa—cannot escape his illegal status unless an ad-
justment of status is approved.138 Subsequently, the court wrote: 
“We need not decide [the exact meaning of ‘permanent’ under 
§ 1432(a)(5)] because Gonzalez entered the country illegally and 
at no time before his eighteenth birthday did he take action to 
ensure that his presence was lawful.”139 In essence, the court 
implied that unlawful entry, combined with the absence of any 
 
 132 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 239. 
 133 In United States v Juarez, 672 F3d 381 (5th Cir 2012), the court considered an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was based in part on the fact that counsel for 
a defendant similarly situated to Gonzalez had not raised the derivative citizenship 
claim as a possible defense. Id at 384, 387. In essence, the defendant in Juarez argued 
that, because lack of citizenship was an element of the charges he faced, and because 
Ashton suggested that citizenship might not require LPR status, his lawyer should have 
raised the issue. Id at 387. The court found in the defendant’s favor, but not based on a 
definitive conclusion that § 1432(a) does not require LPR status. Rather, the court simply 
observed that the Second Circuit’s decision in Ashton made the defense plausible enough 
to give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See id. 
 134 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 240–44. 
 135 Id at 245. 
 136 Id at 244 (“It is not readily apparent that the phrase ‘reside permanently’ con-
tains a legality requirement.”). 
 137 448 F3d 309 (5th Cir 2006). 
 138 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 244, citing Elrawy, 448 F3d at 314. 
 139 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 245. 
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attempt to cure the illegality, made derivative citizenship im-
possible for Gonzalez. 
While these facts, together with the principle articulated in 
Elrawy, make a good case for the argument that Gonzalez had 
not remedied his illegal status, the court did not bridge the gap 
between this conclusion and the question whether the derivative 
citizenship provision could have nonetheless operated. It would 
be one thing if derivative citizenship required an application and 
if that application required that the individual have a particular 
legal status. However, derivative citizenship works by opera-
tion of law; if Gonzalez met the requirements at any point, he 
became a citizen.140 After admitting that the text was unclear, 
the opinion jumped to the conclusion that Gonzalez’s unlawful 
entry, combined with his failure to apply for an adjustment of 
status, implied that he did not “reside permanently.”141 The 
court did so with limited textual and extrinsic support, while 
purporting not to take a position on the meaning of § 1432(a)(5). 
2. Distinguishing the case law supporting the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit cited two early 
twentieth-century Supreme Court opinions to shed light on the 
question of unlawful entry: Kaplan v Tod142 and Zartarian v 
Billings.143 Both of these cases came long before the enactment 
of the INA in 1952; Kaplan was decided in 1925 and Zartarian 
was decided in 1907. In Kaplan, the petitioner had come to the 
United States, but before she entered at Ellis Island, officials 
determined her to be feebleminded144 and ordered that she be 
removed.145 The proceedings were stayed, and she ended up liv-
ing with her father, who was naturalized.146 She claimed that 
her father’s naturalization conferred citizenship on her under 
existing law because she was “dwelling in the United States.”147 
The Court held that since she was in a class of persons deemed 
 
 140 See Charles v Reno, 117 F Supp 2d 412, 416 (D NJ 2000) (noting that “[a] child’s 
acquisition of citizenship on a derivative basis occurs by operation of law”). 
 141 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 245. 
 142 267 US 228 (1925). 
 143 204 US 170 (1907). 
 144 Persons determined to be feebleminded were excludable under another federal 
statute. See Act of Mar 26, 1910 § 1, 36 Stat 263, 263–64.  
 145 Kaplan, 267 US at 229. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id at 230. 
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not admissible, she had never legally “dwelled” in the United 
States within the meaning of then-current immigration law and 
thus was not a citizen.148 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
relied on its previous holding in Zartarian.149 In Zartarian, the 
Court held that an individual excluded for having trachoma 
could not have acquired derivative citizenship, because he “was 
debarred from entering the United States . . . and, never having 
legally landed, of course could not have dwelt within the United 
States.”150 
Though the Fifth Circuit in Gonzalez found these two cases 
instructive, the cases have little bearing on the question of law-
ful entry in the context of § 1432(a). As a threshold matter, it is 
notable that both cases involved interpretations of statutory 
provisions other than those in the INA; consequently, their au-
thority is persuasive at best. Furthermore, there are other rea-
sons to doubt their applicability. Both Kaplan and Zartarian re-
lied on the notion that the petitioners did not “enter” the United 
States. The Court held this to be the case despite the fact that 
the petitioners were physically within the United States’ bound-
aries.151 This fiction was necessary to prevent the derivative citi-
zenship statute from operating, because otherwise any signifi-
cant consecutive time spent in the United States would qualify 
as “dwelling” and would trigger the statute. This holding was 
hugely consequential for the government—indeed, if the Court 
did not allow the fiction to exist, the government would have to 
immediately remove individuals in order to prevent them from 
attaining derivative citizenship, at least in certain cases. Placing 
people on the next ship out of the country regardless of where it 
is headed could easily yield bad results. Given these likely hu-
manitarian consequences, it is clear why the government would 
want to avoid this result. Theoretically, Congress could have 
passed a statute altering the rule, but given the pace at which 
Congress operates, it is not clear whether that would have re-
solved the issue. 
The problems arising out of this strong incentive to remove 
do not exist with respect to undocumented immigrants living in 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Kaplan, 267 US at 230. 
 150 Zartarian, 204 US at 175. 
 151 In a separate case, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated this fiction as fol-
lows: “The petitioner, although physically within our boundaries, is to be regarded as if 
he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction and kept there while his right to en-
ter was under debate.” United States v Ju Toy, 198 US 253, 263 (1905). 
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the United States for an extended period of time without being 
discovered. The government already has an incentive to search 
for such persons, but once they are found, the speed at which the 
government initiates removal proceedings is very unlikely to 
bear on those individuals’ legal statuses. This is because the 
statute is triggered not by “residing permanently” but by “be-
ginning to reside permanently.”152 At the time of detention, ei-
ther an individual has “begun to reside permanently” within the 
meaning of the statute, or he has not. If he has, then he has citi-
zenship (assuming that all other elements of the statute are 
met), and the government will not be able to remove him. If he 
has not, then the statute is not triggered; even a broad view of 
the statute would require some objective, official manifestation 
of intent to reside permanently—presumably one could not 
“begin to reside permanently” while in custody awaiting remov-
al. In this case, the government need not resort to drastic 
measures in order to remove an undocumented immigrant from 
the country. And although it may be theoretically possible for an 
individual to make an objective manifestation of intent to reside 
permanently (as required by Nwozuzu) while in custody, it is dif-
ficult to imagine what this manifestation would be. 
Timing also matters in a more elementary sense: it does vio-
lence to the English language to apply the “dwelling” fiction to 
the situation of an undocumented immigrant living undiscov-
ered in the United States. In Kaplan and Zartarian, the peti-
tioners’ physical presences in the United States were still in 
their early stages and had been contested since their arrivals.153 
By contrast, in Gonzalez, the appellant had lived in the United 
States for nineteen years prior to the initiation of removal pro-
ceedings and had in fact gained LPR status in 2008.154 This sta-
tus did not grant him derivative citizenship under the INA, be-
cause he was twenty-three years old at the time that he gained 
it; thus, his claim would have failed if LPR status—rather than 
merely “residing permanently”—were required. In the context of 
Kaplan and Zartarian, one could plausibly argue that the peti-
tioners were not dwelling in the United States but were merely 
permissively present there. In Gonzalez, there was no element of 
permissiveness vis-à-vis the nineteen years that Gonzalez was 
living in the United States. There is, in essence, no good substi-
 
 152 8 USC § 1432(a)(5) (1994).  
 153 Kaplan, 267 US at 229; Zartarian, 204 US at 172–73. 
 154 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 239. 
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tute language that one can use for his activity—what, indeed, 
was he doing if not residing permanently? To say that he was 
not “residing permanently” flouts the meaning of the term.155 
Furthermore, the petitioners in Kaplan and Zartarian were 
members of classes that were categorically barred from immi-
grating (the mentally challenged in Kaplan and those afflicted 
with contagious diseases in Zartarian).156 While Gonzalez en-
tered the country illegally, this did not categorically mean that 
he could never have lawfully immigrated, obtained LPR status 
(indeed, he obtained this status in 2008), or gained citizenship.157 
It was the manner of his entry that was unlawful, not the fact of 
his entry itself. 
These concerns may have motivated the Second Circuit’s 
characterization of Kaplan and Zartarian as “unhelpful.”158 Ob-
viously, the Fifth Circuit is not bound by the Second Circuit’s 
analysis, and indeed, Kaplan and Zartarian are arguably in-
structive cases in this context. For example, it is an accepted 
canon of statutory construction that Congress legislates against 
the background of existing Supreme Court precedent.159 Apply-
ing this canon strictly, a court could infer that in passing the 
INA, Congress adopted the Supreme Court’s view (as expressed 
in these cases) that one who has not legally landed can never be 
said to be “residing permanently.” 
 
 155 For an example of this type of reasoning, see Green v Bock Laundry Machine Co, 
490 US 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia concurring) (arguing for an interpretation that does the 
“least violence to the text” and does not “give [words] a meaning . . . [that they] simply 
will not bear”). 
 156 Kaplan, 267 US at 229–31; Zartarian, 204 US at 173. See also Act of Mar 26, 
1910 § 1, 36 Stat at 263–64. 
 157 The exact requirements for legally immigrating and gaining a variety of legal 
statuses are numerous and beyond the scope of this Comment. However, possibly the 
strongest “punishment” for illegal immigration is the “3/10 bar.” This provision, passed 
as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
§ 301(b)(1), Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546, 3009-576, codified as amended at 8 
USC § 1182(a)(9), bans those who resided in the United States illegally for more than 
180 days but less than one year from legal admission for three years. It further bans 
those illegally present for one year or more from legal admission for ten years. 8 USC 
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). However, this applies only when illegal immigrants leave the country 
and attempt to reenter. It does not affect those already in the country. This, of course, 
creates interesting incentives for unlawful entrants to stay. See Alex Nowrasteh, Remov-
ing the 3/10 Year Bars Is Not Amnesty (Cato Institute, Apr 23, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/64RZ-SHK5. 
 158 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 330 n 6. 
 159 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich L Rev 67, 
71 (1988). 
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In interpreting an amended statute, courts may presume 
that Congress adopted the prior construction of the statute.160 In 
the leading case, Apex Hosiery Co v Leader,161 the Supreme 
Court applied this canon to a long-standing interpretation of the 
Sherman Act upon a subsequent amendment.162 The Court em-
phasized that because there had been a strong conflict between 
the Court and Congress as to the law’s meaning, and because 
Congress had taken no action to contradict the Court, it could be 
assumed that Congress had accepted the Court’s interpreta-
tion.163 In the immigration context, however, there is no evidence 
that there was a particularly visible conflict between judicial 
and congressional understandings that dictated a conclusion 
that Congress, by failing to act, was acquiescing to the judicial 
interpretation. This may be particularly true given the signif-
icant amount of time that passed between the Kaplan and 
Zartarian decisions and the passage of the INA, in addition to 
the fact that legislative history suggests that the focus of the 
INA was not on derivative citizenship.164 Furthermore, some 
scholars have suggested that congressional inaction may merit 
little weight in resolving ambiguities.165 
As noted above, the Fifth Circuit plainly acknowledged that 
the text of the INA does not speak to this matter, observing that 
“[i]t is not readily apparent that the phrase ‘reside permanently’ 
contains a legality requirement.”166 After noting this, the court 
did not embark on an analysis based on legislative history, pur-
pose, intent, or agency deference. Rather, it looked to two very 
old Supreme Court precedents interpreting a previous statute 
and tenuously argued that those cases supported an interpreta-
tion that lawful entry was required.167 The court did not 
acknowledge the possible distinction between someone who en-
ters the country illegally and someone who, for an extrinsic rea-
son, is categorically prohibited from doing so. Thus, the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation lacks strong support, and the statutory 
and temporal differences between the INA and the laws inter-
 
 160 See id. 
 161 310 US 469 (1940). 
 162 Id at 487–89. 
 163 See id at 488–89. 
 164 See Part III.A.2. 
 165 See, for example, Eskridge, 87 Mich L Rev at 93–94 (cited in note 159) (discuss-
ing the limitations of interpretations based on congressional inaction). 
 166 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 244. 
 167 Id at 245, citing Kaplan, 267 US at 230, and Zartarian, 204 US at 175. 
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preted by Kaplan and Zartarian suggest that acquiescence can-
ons do not save its reasoning. 
Finally, it bears mentioning that the Fifth Circuit’s ap-
proach does not categorically answer the questions posed by un-
lawful entrants, even if one accepts Gonzalez’s holding at face 
value. The court wrote that Gonzalez’s claim failed “because [he] 
entered the country illegally and at no time before his eighteenth 
birthday did he take action to ensure that his presence was law-
ful.”168 Earlier in the opinion, the court discussed Gonzalez’s 
failure to apply for an adjustment of status while he was still 
under the age of eighteen.169 An application for this adjustment 
was, presumably, “action to ensure that his presence was lawful” 
within the meaning of the opinion.170 Considering these two 
parts of the opinion in tandem therefore raises the inference 
that, in the court’s view, merely applying for the adjustment pri-
or to his eighteenth birthday could have constituted an “action 
to ensure that his presence was lawful.”171 Following the court’s 
logic, adjustment could have cured the problem posed by his un-
lawful entry, even if the adjustment were not approved prior to 
his eighteenth birthday. Thus, while the opinion on its face sug-
gests a lawful entry requirement, a close reading implies that 
unlawful entry may not be fatal to a derivative citizenship claim 
if the claimant takes action to cure his unlawful presence prior 
to his eighteenth birthday. 
* * * 
Several different interpretations of § 1432(a)(5) exist. The 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits interpret the provision in such a 
way as to render any question of lawful entry moot. The Second 
Circuit interprets it in a way that allows for the possibility of an 
unlawful entrant gaining derivative citizenship, but this court 
has expressly reserved judgment on the question. The Fifth Cir-
cuit has not taken a position on the identical/independent-
meaning dispute, but it has found—albeit with weak textual, 
precedential, and interpretive support—that an unlawful en-
trant cannot qualify for derivative citizenship without taking 
timely corrective measures to cure his unlawful status. The 
Fifth Circuit has not clarified what these measures need to be. 
 
 168 Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 245 (emphasis added). 
 169 Id at 244. 
 170 Id at 245. 
 171 Id. 
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Considering the diversity of approaches, it is fair to say that the 
question whether unlawful entry disqualifies an individual from 
derivative citizenship remains open. 
III.  COURTS SHOULD NOT REQUIRE LAWFUL ENTRY AS A 
PREREQUISITE FOR DERIVATIVE CITIZENSHIP 
Courts reviewing this issue should, contrary to the Fifth 
Circuit, conclude that § 1432(a) has no lawful entry require-
ment. While seemingly radical, this conclusion is an appropri-
ate construction of the statute and does not require venturing 
beyond traditional methods of interpretation such as a textual 
analysis, a survey of legislative history, and a Chevron agency-
deference model. Furthermore, this conclusion is normatively 
desirable. A resolution allowing derivative citizenship claims to 
proceed even in the presence of unlawful entry could have posi-
tive effects on families and provide certainty to a large set of in-
dividuals who have connections to the United States but none-
theless lack US citizenship. Finally, the countervailing 
arguments against this interpretation are unpersuasive given 
the closed set of individuals to which this holding would apply 
and the likely incentives that individuals and government actors 
face. 
A. Traditional Tools of Legal Analysis Do Not Establish a 
Lawful Entry Requirement 
Textual analysis, legislative history, Chevron analysis, and 
consideration of subsequent legislative action do not counsel in 
favor of a lawful entry requirement. Thus, courts may reason-
ably construe the statute to allow unlawful entrants to claim de-
rivative citizenship if they otherwise meet the requirements of 
§ 1432(a). 
1. Textual analysis does not require lawful entry. 
A textual analysis should begin with the definitions section 
of the INA. The circuit court opinions addressing this issue dis-
cuss the fact that the terms “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence,” “permanent,” and “residence” are each defined sepa-
rately in the statute.172 “Lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence” is defined as “the status of having been lawfully accorded 
 
 172 See, for example, Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 327–28. 
06 HART_CMT_SA (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015 2:36 PM 
2148  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:2119 
   
the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an 
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws.”173 “Perm-
anent” is defined as “a relationship of continuing or lasting na-
ture, as distinguished from [a] temporary [nature]”; the statute, 
however, notes that “a relationship may be permanent even 
though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance 
either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance 
with the law.”174 “Residence” is defined as “the place of general 
abode,” while “the place of general abode of a person means his 
principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.”175 
Initially, it might seem as though these definitions are not 
particularly illuminating. They do not speak to entry at all. The 
requirement of a “principal, actual dwelling place” is independ-
ent of lawful entry. Individuals who are not frequently relocat-
ing must live somewhere, and it would stretch logic and lan-
guage to conclude that someone cannot have a principal, actual 
dwelling place if his presence in the United States is of ques-
tionable legality. The “continuing or lasting nature” language 
does more work, as there is a plausible argument that some-
thing cannot be continual and lasting without being permitted. 
The BIA essentially took this approach in deciding the identi-
cal/independent-meaning question the first time in Matter of 
Nwozuzu.176 The Eleventh Circuit also found this argument per-
suasive in Forey-Quintero.177 
This approach has its own challenges, however. First and 
foremost, it is not clear that it is linguistically accurate on its 
face; the BIA finds the requirement not in the text of the defini-
tions but rather in its assumption that permanence necessarily 
excludes a circumstance in which an individual could be re-
moved.178 Second, the definition of “permanent” includes the pos-
sibility of dissolving a permanent relationship “in accordance 
with the law.”179 Notably, however, the “in accordance with the 
law” language has been read as modifying only the dissolution of 
the relationship and not its formation.180 This implies that one 
 
 173 8 USC § 1101(a)(20). 
 174 8 USC § 1101(a)(31). 
 175 8 USC § 1101(a)(33). 
 176 Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec at 613. 
 177 Forey-Quintero, 626 F3d at 1327. 
 178 See text accompanying notes 94–95. 
 179 8 USC § 1101(a)(31). 
 180 See Ashton, 431 F3d at 98 (rejecting the Government’s argument that this lan-
guage implied that “residing permanently” required LPR status). The Fifth Circuit 
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could form a “relationship” within the meaning of the statute 
without doing so “in accordance with the law.” 
In essence, such a relationship would be a relationship-in-
fact. The notion that a relationship-in-fact is sufficient to meet 
the statutory definition of “permanent” finds further support in 
the definition of “residence.” As discussed above, “residence” is 
defined as “the place of general abode,” and “the place of general 
abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in 
fact, without regard to intent.”181 This language suggests that 
functional considerations, rather than formal requirements, un-
derlie the definitions of “reside” and, by extension, “reside per-
manently.” Congress clearly contemplated mechanisms for a 
more formal recognition of legal status—after all, it created the 
concept of “lawful permanent residence.” The fact that “lawful 
permanent residence” explicitly requires one’s presence to accord 
with the immigration laws, while “permanent” and “residence” 
do not so require, suggests that the latter two terms do not carry 
a legality requirement.182 
This argument is further bolstered by the definition of “law-
fully admitted for permanent residence”: “the status of having 
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in 
the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the im-
migration laws.”183 Notice that this definition includes as a com-
ponent the term “residing permanently.” The definition goes be-
yond that, though, saying that LPR status requires that one 
reside permanently “in accordance with the immigration laws.” 
If “residing permanently” were simply coextensive with LPR sta-
tus, the modifying language would be surplusage.184 Its presence 
suggests that one can “reside permanently” either in accordance 
with the immigration laws or not, but that only the former is 
sufficient for LPR status. One could still “reside permanently,” 
 
acknowledged the force of this argument in Gonzalez, but ultimately it did not decide the 
exact meaning of “in accordance with the law.” Gonzalez, 771 F3d at 245. 
 181 8 USC § 1101(a)(33) (emphasis added). 
 182 This interpretation relies on a version of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
canon. This canon suggests that when Congress specifically provides for something in 
one part of a statute but does not do so in another, it should be inferred that Congress 
intended not to provide for that thing in the latter part. See Landgraf v USI Film Prod-
ucts, 511 US 244, 259 (1994).  
 183 8 USC § 1101(a)(20). 
 184 Another canon of construction, the canon against surplusage, suggests that all 
words in a statute should be given meaning such that none is superfluous. See Stephen 
M. Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33 Campbell L Rev 
115, 122 (2010). 
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within the meaning of the statute, without one’s presence being 
legal. 
While the definitions section of the INA does not provide a 
clear answer to the question of lawful entry, § 1432(a)(5) has at 
least one component that could suggest a lawful entry require-
ment: the “or thereafter begins to reside” language.185 Assuming 
that there is no lawful entry requirement, this leads to an unu-
sual result. This language requires that the child “begin” to 
reside permanently after the triggering naturalization of his 
parent. Read literally, this would mean that a child who began 
to reside permanently prior to the parent’s naturalization would 
not be eligible for derivative citizenship. This is odd because it 
places a major emphasis on when a child began to permanently 
reside in relation to the parent’s naturalization. For example, a 
child who made an “official objective manifestation”186 of intent 
to reside permanently187 prior to the parent’s naturalization 
would not be eligible, while one who performed the exact same 
act after the naturalization would be. 
When courts interpret statutes, they try to avoid “absurd” 
results.188 In conjunction with the lack of a lawful entry re-
quirement, the “begin” language creates an odd result. But is it 
“absurd” for purposes of the canon against absurd results? If the 
answer is yes, that creates another question: How should the 
absurdity be remedied? 
To the threshold question of absurdity, the answer is un-
clear. While courts often speak of “absurd results,” they rarely 
define the term.189 Professor Veronica Dougherty has discussed a 
variety of possible definitions, ranging from logical failure (for 
example, a statute might seemingly require two incongruous ac-
tions) to a violation of simple common sense.190 Other approach-
es treat the contravention of legislative intent or the creation of 
a simple “injustice” as rendering a statutory interpretation ab-
 
 185 8 USC § 1432(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 186 Ashton, 431 F3d at 99. 
 187 This is the language of Ashton. Recall that in Ashton, the Second Circuit sug-
gested the possibility that a “lesser official objective manifestation” of intent to reside 
permanently could suffice for a § 1432(a) claim. Id. See also Part II.B. 
 188 See Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the 
Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 Am U L Rev 127, 128 (1994) (ob-
serving that the absurd-result principle “authorizes a judge to ignore a statute’s plain 
words in order to avoid the outcome those words would require in a particular situation”). 
 189 See id at 139–40. 
 190 Id at 141–53. 
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surd.191 The above interpretation of the word “begins” would be-
stow citizenship on one group but not another based on arbitrary 
actions unrelated to each group’s relative worthiness for citizen-
ship. Absent evidence of congressional intent, this looks like an 
absurd result. 
One counterargument to the alleged absurdity is as follows. 
Once a parent is naturalized, the procedural hurdles of bringing 
a child into the country are lower and citizenship for the child is 
easier to obtain. As such, prior to parental naturalization, LPR 
status serves as a signal of commitment—but after parental 
naturalization, something less suffices. The problem is that this 
remains difficult to square with the underlying policy goal of 
family unity.192 If one accepts parental naturalization as an indi-
cator that the family is serious about residing in the United 
States, the case for differentiating based on manner of entry is 
weakened, particularly if, as juveniles, the individuals in ques-
tion receive a greater degree of lenity for conduct that is other-
wise frowned upon.193 If parental naturalization is really the 
signal of a family’s commitment to the United States, it makes 
little sense to differentiate based on whether a child began to re-
side permanently before or after this event. Thus, the absurdity 
remains. 
Accepting absurdity for the sake of argument, courts must 
determine the proper way to remedy the absurdity. A lawful en-
try requirement does not accomplish this. Even with a lawful 
entry requirement, the problem of a lawful entrant who “began” 
to reside permanently prior to naturalization still exists. The 
problem can be fixed only if “reside permanently” and “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence” are read as having the same 
meaning. For the reasons previously discussed, this is not the 
optimal reading of the statute.194 However, there is a way to both 
remedy the absurdity and allow each prong to have an inde-
pendent meaning. Namely, courts should hold that one cannot 
“begin” to permanently reside for the purposes of a derivative 
citizenship claim without a combination of “lesser official objec-
tive manifestation”195 (which may on its own be difficult to pin 
 
 191 See D. Wiley Barker, The Absurd Results Doctrine, Chevron, and Climate 
Change, 26 BYU J Pub L 73, 75–76 (2012). 
 192 For a discussion of family unity as a policy goal underlying federal immigration 
law, see Parts I.C.1, III.B. 
 193 See note 245. 
 194 See Part II.B. See also notes 182–90 and accompanying text.  
 195 Ashton, 431 F3d at 99. 
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down temporally) and parental naturalization. Put another way, 
courts should hold that one does not “begin” to reside until two 
predicate events happen: the official objective manifestation and 
the naturalization of the parent. These events would not need to 
follow a particular order, but they would both need to occur. 
This avoids the absurdity while also giving independent mean-
ings to each phrase. Thus, as a way of avoiding an absurd result, 
this interpretation is superior to simply reading both clauses of 
§ 1432(a)(5) as having identical meanings.  
The text does not have a plain requirement of lawful entry. 
While certain textual considerations could support such a find-
ing to avoid absurd results, on balance, the better reading is 
that it does not. Textual considerations suggest that to reside 
permanently does not require a lawful status, and one could in-
fer from this that lawful entry is not required. In fairness, the 
statute also does not explicitly say that lawful entry is not re-
quired, but this is not dispositive. Given the significance of this 
issue and the lack of a clear textual signal, a better reading from 
the text alone is that there is no lawful entry requirement. Oth-
er methods of statutory interpretation also suggest that courts 
could reasonably find that there is no lawful entry requirement. 
2. Legislative history, legislative intent, and canons of 
construction do not compel courts to find a lawful entry 
requirement. 
On its face, the meaning of § 1432(a) is unclear. Courts 
should therefore look beyond the text of the statute to see 
whether Congress has evinced a particular purpose or intent 
concerning a lawful entry requirement. However, the INA’s leg-
islative record does not clearly support either interpretation of 
§ 1432(a). Much of the debate concerning the bill focused on the 
revisions to the quota system.196 This is not wholly unrelated to 
derivative citizenship; as originally enacted, the INA exempted 
from quotas certain family members who were potentially eligi-
ble for derivative citizenship.197 That said, there is little direct 
evidence, either in the House report for the bill or in the tran-
 
 196 See, for example, 98 Cong Rec at 4308–11 (cited in note 60) (debating proposals 
to “liberalize the quota system and make it conform with world conditions”). 
 197 See HR Rep 82-1365 at 38–39 (cited in note 44) (noting that the INA establishes 
new quota allocations for the issuance of visas “to spouses and children of alien residents 
of the United States admitted for lawful permanent residence”). 
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scripts of floor debates, concerning derivative citizenship.198 Other 
extrinsic sources, such as President Harry Truman’s veto mes-
sage, likewise fail to shed much light.199 Despite the fact that 
very little legislative history and very few extrinsic sources bear 
on the specific issue of a lawful entry requirement, there is value 
in examining these sources for indications of a broader congres-
sional intent or purpose to inform the analysis. 
Several factors weigh in favor of the view that lawful entry 
is not required to obtain derivative citizenship. To begin, consid-
er the following language from the House report: “[This bill] im-
plements the underlying intention of our immigration laws re-
garding the preservation of the family unit. An American citizen 
. . . will be able to bring his alien minor child as a nonquota im-
migrant.”200 The report later states that “adequate provision is 
made for the preferential treatment of close relatives of United 
States citizens and alien residents consistent with the well-
established policy of maintaining the family unit wherever pos-
sible.”201 Taken together, these passages indicate that the prefer-
ence for maintaining family units was of paramount importance 
to Congress. This preference counsels in favor of a broad reading 
of the derivative citizenship provisions, since almost by defini-
tion they operate to preserve family units. 
However, there are also arguments that cut in the other di-
rection. Despite the report’s emphasis on family unity, it also 
contains two passages that indirectly counsel in favor of finding 
a lawful entry requirement. First, the purpose of the bill, as 
stated in the House report, was “to enact a comprehensive, re-
vised immigration, naturalization, and nationality code.”202 Sec-
ond, the report describes individuals who enter the country ille-
 
 198 This is not to say that the subject never came up. As noted in Part I.C.1, Repre-
sentative Dolliver spoke to the importance of the derivative citizenship provision. How-
ever, Dolliver focused primarily on the provision’s value in reducing the number of bills 
for private relief that Congress would need to pass. 
 199 See generally President Harry S. Truman, Veto of Bill to Revise the Laws Relat-
ing to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, 1952 Pub Papers 441. Truman’s 
veto message expressed some concern for family unity and the citizenship of children. 
However, it primarily concerned discriminatory quotas and constitutional issues sur-
rounding deportation and separation of powers. Congress was able to override the veto, 
but it is not clear what conclusion one should draw from the passage of this bill, consid-
ering the multiple elements both of Truman’s objections and of congressional intent. Ul-
timately, nothing in the interplay between the executive and legislative branches bears 
on the question at hand. 
 200 HR Rep No 82-1365 at 29 (cited in note 44). 
 201 Id at 38–39. 
 202 Id at 5. 
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gally as one of the “principal classes of deportable aliens.”203 If 
indeed Congress intended to enact a comprehensive reform 
agenda and simultaneously viewed unlawful entrants as per se 
deportable, it would seem to have hidden a significant exception 
to this principle if there were no lawful entry requirement im-
plicit in § 1432(a). Here, Whitman v American Trucking Associa-
tions, Inc204 is particularly apposite: “Congress . . . does not alter 
the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms 
or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide ele-
phants in mouseholes.”205 It is difficult to make a case that Con-
gress intended to dispense with a lawful entry requirement with 
respect to § 1432(a), absent a clearer indicator that it was doing so. 
That said, the elephants-in-mouseholes principle is not fatal 
to an argument that there is no lawful entry requirement. Had 
such a requirement clearly existed in law prior to the passage of 
the INA, the lack of a clear statement would be a stronger ar-
gument in favor of inferring a lawful entry requirement. This is 
due to the presumption against implied repeals, which suggests 
that courts should not read a later statute as repealing an earli-
er one unless it does so expressly.206 However, preexisting deriv-
ative citizenship law did not speak directly to the issue. As such, 
finding that there is no lawful entry requirement does not im-
plicitly repeal any statute, so the presumption against implied 
repeals does not suggest that lawful entry is required. 
It is not clear that either side of the ledger has the better of 
the argument on the issue of congressional silence. However, 
given the ambiguities, one cannot say for certain that Congress 
intended to create a lawful entry requirement. Thus, there is 
room for a court to conclude that such a requirement is not im-
plicit in § 1432(a). 
However, another canon of construction suggests that courts 
should decline to find such a requirement. This canon is the 
“immigration rule of lenity,”207 exemplified by cases such as Im-
 
 203 Id at 60. 
 204 531 US 457 (2001). 
 205 Id at 468. 
 206 See Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption against Implied 
Repeals, 92 Cal L Rev 487, 488–89 (2004). 
 207 See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 
Georgetown Immig L J 515, 519–25 (2003). Scholars have raised questions about how 
this canon should fare in light of Chevron. See generally, for example, id. See also Adam 
B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U Chi L Rev 1671, 1675 (2007). 
However, given post-Chevron cases such as Immigration and Naturalization Service v 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421 (1987), and Immigration and Nationalization Service v St. 
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migration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca.208 This 
case centered on the standard required to prove the fear of per-
secution that is a prerequisite to a grant of asylum.209 In consid-
ering ambiguities in the relationship between the INA in gen-
eral and the asylum provision in 8 USC § 1158 in particular, the 
Court in Cardoza-Fonseca noted a “longstanding principle of 
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in 
favor of the alien.”210 
While a derivative citizenship statute and an asylum stat-
ute do not necessarily serve the same interests, the Court’s prin-
ciple still has some utility, for two reasons. First, practically 
speaking, both derivative citizenship and asylum claims may 
arise in the context of removal proceedings, because a successful 
claim for either is a defense to removal. In one scenario, a poten-
tial subject of removal argues that he should not be removed, on 
the ground that he qualifies for derivative citizenship; in the 
other, he argues against removal based on a fear that he will be 
persecuted in his home country. Since the possibility of removal 
for the immigrant is the same in either scenario, it stands to 
reason that the immigration rule of lenity applies in both. 
Additionally, the differences between a derivative citizen-
ship defense and a fear of persecution defense (the defense at is-
sue in Cardoza-Fonseca) counsel in favor of applying the rule of 
lenity to the derivative citizenship context.211 If a court “gets it 
wrong” in the case of a fear of persecution defense and orders 
the removal of an individual who is then persecuted, there is 
certainly a human cost. However, the person who suffers is not a 
US citizen and makes no claim to be such. Contrast this with 
“getting it wrong” in the context of a derivative citizenship 
claim: If the individual claimant is correct, he is a US citizen by 
operation of law. Removing this person effectively entails ban-
ishing a US citizen from his country. If one conceives of a state’s 
role as protecting its citizens, this is one of the most egregious 
 
Cyr, 533 US 289 (2001), it seems as though the canon survives in substance, even if 
courts do not always refer to it by its name.  
 208 480 US 421 (1987). 
 209 Id at 423. 
 210 Id at 449, citing Immigration and Naturalization Service v Errico, 385 US 214, 
225 (1966), Costello v Immigration and Naturalization Service, 376 US 120, 128 (1964), 
and Fong Haw Tan v Phelan, 333 US 6, 10 (1948). 
 211 To be eligible for asylum under 8 USC § 1158, an individual must reasonably 
fear persecution in his home country. 
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ways in which a state could fail.212 The question, then, is where 
the errors are better placed.213 An overly restrictive interpretation 
of the derivative citizenship statute will lead to the expulsion of 
US citizens. 
While the comparative negative impact of erroneous expul-
sions and erroneous grants of citizenship may be a normative 
question, dicta indicate that care should be taken concerning the 
possibility of erroneous removal. In Duarte-Ceri v Holder,214 the 
Second Circuit noted that “[f]aced with two plausible readings of 
the statutory language . . . the circumstances of this case and 
principles of statutory construction require us to adopt the in-
terpretation that preserves rather than extinguishes citizen-
ship.”215 Citing several Supreme Court cases, the court observed 
a general trend urging restraint in cases that may result in re-
moval.216 Duarte-Ceri and the cases it cites suggest that, when 
faced with ambiguities in a case possibly resulting in removal, 
courts should favor a finding of citizenship. 
3. Chevron analysis does not compel courts to find a lawful 
entry requirement. 
Courts generally analyze agency interpretations of statutes 
under the two-part analysis described in Chevron U.S.A. Inc v 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.217 First, courts are to 
assess “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
 
 212 For a discussion of this view of the state’s role, see Martin Carnoy, The State and 
Political Theory 20 (Princeton 1984) (describing John Locke’s vision of the state as an 
entity growing out of a collective desire to protect one another from base instincts that 
are present in the state of nature). Other conceptions of the state also include the protec-
tion of members as a critical responsibility of the state. See id at 216. 
 213 There is a significant amount of literature, across multiple bodies of law, arguing 
that error minimization is an appropriate goal of legal rules. See, for example, Mark 
Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Man-
datorily Detained Immigrants pending Removal Proceedings, 18 Mich J Race & L 63, 109 
(2012) (arguing that the risk of error in immigration proceedings is high due to their 
complexity, and suggesting that counsel is needed as a result); Kate Stith, The Risk of 
Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Ap-
peal, 57 U Chi L Rev 1, 4 (1990) (arguing that error allocation is an equal goal to error 
minimization in the criminal context). 
 214 630 F3d 83 (2d Cir 2010). 
 215 Id at 88. 
 216 Id at 89, citing Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 159 (1963), Delgadillo 
v Carmichael, 332 US 388, 391 (1947), and Fong Haw Tan, 333 US at 10. 
 217 467 US 837 (1984). 
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end of the matter.”218 If the reviewing court finds that Congress 
has not spoken clearly to the matter, it “does not simply impose 
its own construction on the statute. . . . [Rather,] the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.”219 Additionally, there is a 
third, threshold step, sometimes referred to as “Chevron step ze-
ro,” outlined in United States v Mead Corp.220 Prior to conducting 
the two-step Chevron analysis, courts should determine whether 
the agency’s action has the “force of law.”221 If the action does not 
have this force, Chevron is inapplicable. Agencies are likely to be 
acting with this force of law when carrying out adjudications.222 
The BIA conducts adjudications that legally bind both the par-
ties and, in the case of precedential decisions, future parties.223 
Importantly, Matter of Nwozuzu was designated as preceden-
tial.224 This suggests that the decision is entitled to deference.225 
Indeed, even when the Second Circuit reversed the BIA, it con-
ceded that Chevron was the proper framework for reviewing the 
decision.226 
In practice, however, Chevron deference to the BIA is ap-
plied inconsistently.227 A recent note argues that this incon-
sistency is problematic, and that a better framework would be to 
consider the underlying principles of Chevron and Mead and ap-
ply deference only when the BIA’s decision is a product of supe-
rior institutional competence.228 In Matter of Nwozuzu, however, 
the BIA relied on tools of statutory construction and linguis-
tics—not on its specialized expertise—to rule on the LPR re-
 
 218 Id at 842. 
 219 Id at 843. 
 220 533 US 218 (2001). Professor Cass R. Sunstein has described Mead as part of a 
trilogy of cases making up Chevron step zero, with the other two being Barnhart v Wal-
ton, 535 US 212 (2002), and Christensen v Harris County, 529 US 576 (2000). See Cass 
R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 211–18 (2006). 
 221 Mead, 533 US at 227. 
 222 See id at 229. 
 223 See BIA, Practice Manual at *8 (cited in note 32). 
 224 See id. Note that Matter of Nwozuzu carries the “I&N Dec” reporter abbreviation 
in its citation, which indicates that it is published. 
 225 See Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does 
Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 NYU Ann Surv Am L 503, 519–20 
(2013) (discussing how adjudication may be a good indicator of deference). 
 226 See Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 326–27 (conceding that Chevron is the proper frame-
work under which to analyze BIA decisions). 
 227 For a broad discussion of Chevron and its interactions with the BIA, see Chaffin, 
Note, 69 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 509–25 (cited in note 225). 
 228 See id at 507–09. 
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quirement.229 Furthermore, it did not directly rule on the lawful 
entry issue. Instead, it merely flirted with a resolution, saying in 
dicta that “‘residing permanently’ [ ] includes an implied re-
quirement that the residence be lawful.”230 
Dicta, by definition, do not have the force of law. Mead sug-
gests that to be afforded full Chevron deference, agency pro-
nouncements must have the force of law. Syllogistically, Mead 
therefore suggests that the BIA’s dicta should not be accorded 
Chevron deference. That said, dicta of the BIA may still be use-
ful for a reviewing court. Barnhart v Walton231 is instructive in 
assessing this use, as it offers rationales for deference, including 
“the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related exper-
tise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administra-
tion of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and 
the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over 
a long period of time.”232 In this case, the legal question is cer-
tainly interstitial; it is not squarely presented, but it nonethe-
less arises inevitably if a particular interpretation of the stat-
ute—namely, the version giving the two clauses independent 
meaning—wins out. This counsels in favor of deference. How-
ever, the question’s importance to the administration of the 
statute is unclear. A resolution would likely not radically change 
how individuals behave, particularly because the set of affected 
individuals is closed at this point. The statute has been re-
pealed, so the question is not how it will operate going forward 
but only whether it operated on certain individuals prior to its 
repeal. As such, it is unlikely that the interpretation will greatly 
affect primary conduct.  
Furthermore, the question is also one of nontechnical stat-
utory interpretation. It does not require expertise, nor is there a 
long history of agency interpretations one way or another; one 
cannot say that the BIA has given careful consideration to the 
issue of lawful entry for a long period of time.233 This suggests 
that some of the factors motivating Chevron deference in Barn-
hart are not present here. While the BIA is entitled to some def-
erence for its published decisions, dicta supporting these deci-
 
 229 See text accompanying notes 104–07. 
 230 Matter of Nwozuzu, 24 I&N Dec at 609. 
 231 535 US 212 (2002). 
 232 Id at 222. 
 233 Matter of Nwozuzu appears to be the only published case that even raised the 
issue prior to Gonzalez. 
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sions (particularly on issues that do not require special exper-
tise) need not be accorded the same deference, both as a matter 
of doctrine and as a matter of practicality.234 Affording deference 
to dicta would create a regime so deferential that courts 
would be severely limited in taking advantage of their own in-
stitutional competence in the area of statutory interpreta-
tion.235 Therefore, Chevron does not preclude a court from con-
cluding that § 1432(a) does not contain a lawful entry 
requirement. 
4. The repeal of the statute does not clarify the situation. 
The specific language of the INA, in the wake of the passage 
of the CCA, is no longer ambiguous. The CCA eliminated the “or 
thereafter begins to reside permanently” language from the 
statute.236 This amendment completely moots the question 
whether the clauses have identical or independent meanings; 
the law now clearly requires LPR status to gain derivative citi-
zenship, so the answer to the identical/independent-meaning 
question is of no consequence going forward. Can one read any-
thing into this repeal with regard to congressional intent vis-à-
vis a lawful entry requirement? The answer is not entirely clear. 
First and foremost, there is little evidence that Congress 
was thinking about lawful entry when it made this change. As 
discussed in Part I.A.3, the CCA was intended to ease the pro-
cesses of adopting foreign-born children and ensuring that these 
children have citizenship. This consideration is rather detached 
from any discussion of derivative citizenship for unlawful en-
trants. Also, it is unclear why “or thereafter begins to reside 
permanently” was taken out of the statute. Furthermore, even if 
Congress were conscious of the issue, it is not clear what conclu-
sion courts should draw from the revision. One possibility is that 
Congress understood “or thereafter begins to reside permanently” 
as creating a pathway to derivative citizenship for unlawful en-
trants. If so, then the repeal of that language tells us that Con-
gress no longer wanted this to be an option—but it simultane-
 
 234 This is merely a justification for denying deference, but in practice, it seems as 
though courts defer less to executive immigration authorities than Chevron might sug-
gest. For a more extensive discussion of this issue and a broader analysis of deference in 
the context of immigration law, see generally Cox, 74 U Chi L Rev 1671 (cited in note 
207); Chaffin, Note, 69 NYU Ann Surv Am L 503 (cited in note 225). 
 235 See Chaffin, Note, 69 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 507–09 (cited in note 225). 
 236 See notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
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ously suggests that those who met § 1432(a)’s requirements pri-
or to its repeal were citizens, regardless of whether they entered 
unlawfully. 
Another possibility is that Congress did not see permanent 
residency as creating a pathway to citizenship but rather was 
afraid that the statute was ambiguous and would be interpreted 
in favor of allowing unlawful entrants to claim derivative citi-
zenship. This could support a finding of a lawful entry require-
ment, in that a court might want to align itself with some known 
vision of congressional intent. But if the only known vision of 
congressional intent is intent at the time of repeal, a court would 
be justified in taking a different tack if it believed the intent at 
the time of passage to be different. The repeal also could suggest 
that Congress sought to clarify the issue for the future, given 
that it could not retroactively remove citizenship.237 Congress’s 
intent at the time of the statute’s repeal can take the analysis 
only so far. 
It may also be that Congress did not consider the issue at 
all. Given the multiplicity of possible interpretations, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that the repeal compels one interpretation or 
another. If Congress was indeed not thinking about this issue at 
the time of repeal, courts are left with only the traditional tools 
of statutory interpretation (for example, considerations of text 
and legislative purpose)—tools that, as discussed above, do not 
require a finding of a lawful entry requirement. 
* * * 
Various tools of statutory construction and legal analysis 
suggest that § 1432(a) does not require lawful entry. The text of 
 
 237 The question whether Congress can withdraw citizenship once it has been be-
stowed on an individual was considered in Rogers v Bellei, 401 US 815 (1971). In that 
case, the Court considered a law granting citizenship to individuals born abroad to one 
American parent, thus receiving conditional citizenship at birth under § 301(b) of the 
INA. Id at 816–17. The grant of citizenship contained conditions subsequent, which the 
plaintiff failed to meet. Id at 817. The Court held § 301(b) to be constitutional, but noted 
that, per Afroyim v Rusk, 387 US 253 (1967), a person who naturalizes in the United 
States is protected by the naturalization clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus 
cannot lose citizenship involuntarily. See Bellei, 401 US at 822–23. See also Afroyim, 387 
US at 257 (holding that Congress has no “general power, express or implied, to take 
away an American citizen’s citizenship without his assent”). Because the trigger for ac-
quiring derivative citizenship under § 1432(a) is permanent residence in the United 
States, it would seem that naturalization under that section necessarily takes place in 
the United States, thus bringing it into the domain of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
removing Congress’s power to strip away citizenship. 
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the statute does not mandate one conclusion or another. Analy-
sis based on legislative history suggests that competing concerns 
weigh in favor of either interpretation, and neither set of con-
cerns is dispositive. Chevron does not compel a finding of a law-
ful entry requirement, because the BIA has not spoken to the is-
sue with the force of law. Finally, the repeal of the particular 
statutory text in question does little to illuminate the issue. Fac-
ing no clear answer from the tools of statutory construction, the 
next Section turns to a consideration of the normative implica-
tions of either interpretation, and it argues that it is normatively 
superior for courts to hold that § 1432(a) does not require lawful 
entry. 
B. Public Policy Considerations Do Not Support a Lawful 
Entry Requirement 
As the previous discussion makes apparent, vagueness 
plagues § 1432(a). The face of the statute does not establish 
whether it requires lawful entry. Furthermore, while various 
modes of statutory analysis may inform the answer, none is dis-
positive. This Section argues that the optimal interpretation is 
that § 1432(a) contains no lawful entry requirement. Far from 
being an unreasoned attempt at amnesty, such an interpretation 
would represent an effort by courts to work within the confines 
of their institutional roles to alleviate a pressing policy problem. 
While it may be counterintuitive, the statute’s vagueness allows 
courts to rule against a lawful entry requirement without stray-
ing outside the statutory text. 
As discussed in Part I.C, there are several normative justifi-
cations for derivative citizenship, and these justifications can in-
form a reading of § 1432(a). A broad reading of the statute sup-
ports family unification. Further, consider the group of persons 
eligible for derivative citizenship under the statute—they have 
at least one citizen parent, and they have at least manifested an 
official intent to reside permanently in the United States.238 This 
suggests that these individuals may be more interested in as-
similating into US society. If assimilation is a goal, as some 
scholars have suggested, immigrants who are more attached to 
the country and thus more likely to assimilate should receive fa-
vorable treatment from the immigration laws.239 
 
 238 See 8 USC § 1432(a) (1994). See also Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 334. 
 239 See note 55 and accompanying text. 
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As of 2012, approximately 16.6 million people in the United 
States were living in families of mixed status.240 This presents a 
dilemma. On the one hand, there is an interest in protecting the 
sanctity of citizenship and enforcing the immigration laws. On 
the other hand, immigration laws exist to protect the interests of 
the United States and its citizens, and some of these citizens 
surely have family members who are in the country illegally. 
The benefits of strictly enforcing immigration laws against a 
particular individual accrue broadly (that is, no one citizen 
benefits acutely from a removal), while the harms accrue nar-
rowly to specific individuals—typically, to noncitizens who are 
removed.241 In an efficient system, the benefits should outweigh 
the harms. However, if the individual to be removed has an im-
mediate family member (in the case of a § 1432(a) claim, a par-
ent) who is a citizen, collateral harm redounds to a US citizen. 
This calls into question whether, in the case of a removal in 
which the individual subject to removal has a citizen parent, the 
cost-benefit calculation weighs against removal.242 
It is also worth considering what would happen to these in-
dividuals if a court were to impose a lawful entry requirement. 
The choice is not one between citizenship on the one hand and 
the elimination of the possibility of citizenship on the other. Un-
lawful entrants may become LPRs and citizens, but the process 
is cumbersome. Consider the 3/10 bar: as noted previously, this 
provision of the INA prohibits reentry for a statutorily specified 
period of time for those who are in the United States illegally 
 
 240 Joanna Dreby, How Today’s Immigration Enforcement Policies Impact Children, 
Families, and Communities: A View from the Ground *1 (Center for American Progress, Aug 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/A725-ZLTJ. See also note 56 and accompanying text. 
 241 There is a classical public-choice response to this argument—namely, that con-
centrated interest groups should succeed over the general public. See David A. Skeel Jr, 
Book Review, Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholar-
ship, 50 Vand L Rev 647, 651–52 (1997). The response to this is twofold: First, those who 
are present unlawfully have less sway over legislators because they cannot vote. Second, 
aggressive immigration enforcement may reduce the ability of immigrants and their 
families to organize, out of fear. For a discussion of the chilling effect of immigration 
enforcement on immigrant communities, see Jacqueline Hagan, Brianna Castro, and 
Nestor Rodriguez, The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families and 
Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88 NC L Rev 1799, 1813–18 (2010) (“[R]esearch 
. . . documents the devastating economic, social, and psychological effects of expanded 
interior enforcement on immigrant families and the communities where they live.”). 
 242 See Hagan, Castro, and Rodriguez, 88 NC L Rev at 1813–18 (cited in note 241) 
(discussing the costs of immigration enforcement on communities). While this research 
focuses primarily on undocumented immigrants, there is significant overlap in the fami-
lies of legal residents and undocumented individuals, as previously discussed. See text 
accompanying note 240.  
06 HART_CMT_SA (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015 2:36 PM 
2015] Citizens All Along 2163 
 
but who leave to adjust their statuses.243 This policy draws a fair 
amount of scrutiny, notwithstanding any consideration of deriv-
ative citizenship.244 In the case of potential derivative citizens, 
however, it raises additional concerns. If individuals in this set 
are held not to be citizens, they must wait up to ten years for a 
chance to return. Because these individuals likely have a rela-
tively strong connection to the United States—given that they 
have at least one citizen parent and have done something to 
manifest their intent to remain—the cost of excluding them may 
be higher on average than the cost of excluding the average un-
lawful entrant. 
Two facts suggest that those individuals who are potentially 
eligible for citizenship under § 1432(a) merit favorable consider-
ation. First, these individuals began to permanently reside in 
the United States while under the age of eighteen, which implies 
that their illegal entries took place while they were minors. The 
law is generally less punitive toward minors,245 so the notion 
that there is a retributive reason to deny citizenship based on il-
legal entry carries less weight than it otherwise might. Second, 
they have established intent to reside permanently. This intent, 
combined with the existence of their US-citizen parents, sug-
gests that these individuals have stronger ties to the United 
States and are more deserving of citizenship than standard ap-
plicants.246 It is less desirable to deny citizenship to these indi-
 
 243 See note 157. 
 244 See, for example, Immigration Policy Center, So Close and Yet So Far: How the 
Three- and Ten-Year Bars Keep Families Apart (American Immigration Council, July 25, 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/H78G-MB5D. See also note 157. 
 245 See, for example, Miller v Alabama, 132 S Ct 2455, 2463–65 (2012) (considering 
how youth affects sentencing, and collecting cases that demonstrate consistent judicial 
recognition of the fact that children are different from adults for the purposes of criminal 
law). See also Errico, 385 US at 220 n 9 (“The legislative history of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act clearly indicates that the Congress intended to provide for a liberal 
treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United 
States citizens and immigrants united.”). 
 246 The narrative of some immigrants being “deserving” and others “undeserving” is, 
admittedly, complex and flawed. Nonetheless, it appears to hold sway in court decisions 
and scholarship about immigration, and it is thus worth considering as a factor in the 
analysis. See, for example, Posner, 80 U Chi L Rev at 297 (cited in note 55) (describing 
“the good type of immigrant” as having “two major characteristics: (1) skills that are val-
uable for domestic employers and (2) assimilability”). For a more detailed discussion of 
the “good immigrant”/“bad immigrant” dichotomy that frequently rears its head, see 
Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narra-
tives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 Georgetown Immig L J 207, 226–36 (2012) (dis-
cussing the ways in which the framing of immigrants as “good” or “bad” affects judicial 
decisionmaking). 
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viduals than to others, and thus the inefficiencies of the 3/10 bar 
have a greater negative effect. Allowing these individuals to 
qualify for § 1432(a) derivative citizenship would alleviate this 
issue. There is little benefit to forcing persons potentially eligi-
ble for visas to leave the country in order to get on the citizen-
ship track, particularly if they have already evinced intent to 
remain. 
The above analysis suggests that the costs of removal in 
these circumstances may be higher than usual. But what about 
the benefits? Here, it makes sense to return again to the goals of 
the statute and of broader immigration policy. As noted in Part 
I.C.1, family unification is a key goal of US immigration policy. 
Floor remarks and the House report accompanying the INA 
clearly show that this was a goal of the statute.247 Though 
Truman vetoed the bill, his veto message may in fact be of some 
use. Because it simultaneously praised elements of the INA for 
encouraging family unity while justifying the veto by citing oth-
er areas in which the bill did not go far enough (or, in Truman’s 
view, regressed), it suggested a broad policy favoring family uni-
fication.248 Additionally, courts have relied on family unity as an 
important policy consideration in decisionmaking; consider the 
Second Circuit’s remark in Nwozuzu that “[c]learly, Congress 
did not intend for the children of U.S. citizens to be strictly 
bound by all the formal requirements of the immigration laws 
applicable to adults.”249  
The Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment. In Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v Errico,250 it noted that “Con-
gress felt that, in many circumstances, it was more important to 
unite families and preserve family ties than it was to enforce 
strictly” various sections of the INA.251 Congress’s actions sug-
gest a clear public policy favoring leniency when it comes to both 
the children and families of citizens. When one discusses deriva-
tive citizenship, one is by definition discussing the possibility of 
citizenship for family members of US citizens. It makes little 
sense, then, to infer requirements that do not exist in the text 
when they would serve to make derivative citizenship more dif-
ficult to obtain. 
 
 247 See text accompanying notes 59–60.  
 248 See note 199. 
 249 Nwozuzu, 726 F3d at 332. 
 250 385 US 214 (1966). 
 251 Id at 220. 
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Immigration has been and remains a significant issue in 
modern American politics. While immigration policy raises 
many issues, perhaps the central conundrum is how to address 
the vast population of undocumented individuals present in the 
United States. Mass removals may offend individual or group 
values, but blanket amnesty runs counter to a sense of fair-
ness.252 These are long-term political and policy problems. 
Courts are simply not empowered to solve dilemmas like this on 
their own, nor should they be. This does not mean, however, 
that a court should never consider the policy implications of in-
terpretations of ambiguous language. Section 1432(a) is vague, 
but an analysis of the statute’s plain text demonstrates that no 
lawful entry requirement exists. A construction of the statute 
that does not require lawful entry would provide a means with 
which to provide certainty of status to a subset of the undocu-
mented population in a way that is consistent with existing law. 
C. The Limited Applicability of § 1432(a) Negates the Potential 
Negative Effects of Finding No Lawful Entry Requirement 
While the preceding Section offers a discussion of the bene-
fits of a determination that there is no lawful entry requirement, 
it is only fair to acknowledge possible costs and lines of argu-
ment against this interpretation. However, given the unusual 
circumstances surrounding § 1432(a) (namely, that it has been 
repealed and remains in effect only for a discrete subset of peo-
ple), the arguments against this conclusion lack force. 
A simple argument against rules that make citizenship re-
quirements more flexible in regard to undocumented immi-
grants is that they create perverse incentives. At a time when 
the undocumented population is swelling, the argument goes, 
Congress and the courts should not make rules that make it 
more attractive to enter the country unlawfully.253 An evaluation 
of the empirical basis of this claim is outside the scope of this 
Comment, but on its face, the claim is at least reasonable. Does 
this argument present a problem for a construction of 
 
 252 For a discussion of the various conflicting values that underlie immigration en-
forcement (or the lack thereof), see Christopher Angevine, Amnesty and the “Legality” of 
Illegal Immigration: How Reliance and Underenforcement Inform the Immigration De-
bate, 50 S Tex L Rev 235, 251–55 (2008) (describing the conflict between the fairness 
concerns pushing against amnesty versus the reliance interests pushing for it). 
 253 See, for example, Lamar Smith, To End Illegal Immigration, Eliminate the In-
centives (NY Times, Sept 1, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/W6PY-HV39. 
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§ 1432(a) that is lenient toward those who have entered the 
country unlawfully? 
In short, no. Because § 1432(a) has been repealed, the uni-
verse of individuals covered by the statute is finite. The relevant 
question is not whether the statute confers citizenship on some-
one now, but whether it conferred citizenship when the statute 
was still operative. As such, the class of individuals potentially 
affected is closed—and shrinking, given that some members will 
die each year. At this point, the class is set, and no other individ-
uals can join it. That being the case, a construction of § 1432(a) 
that allows this class eligibility for derivative citizenship cannot 
have the perverse incentive effects that other policy changes lib-
eralizing citizenship rules might have. 
In this case, there is no possibility that citizens with chil-
dren residing in other countries will observe this change and 
consequently encourage their children to unlawfully enter the 
United States, because these children would not be able to meet 
the requirements of the current statute. The practical problem 
stems not from the inflow of possible derivative citizenship 
claimants but from the question of what should be done with re-
spect to those already present in the country. This is analogous 
to concerns that have motivated state efforts to support undoc-
umented children—for example, even politically conservative 
states have passed legislation to help these children obtain an 
education.254 An impulse may exist to deny citizenship as a puni-
tive measure for immigrants’ illegal entries, but such denial of 
citizenship would have significant negative consequences for 
immigrants’ citizen family members, whose interests US policy 
purports to protect. Furthermore, given that the possible claim-
ants would have had to enter the country as minors, it is unclear 
how much punishment is warranted. Who wins when an indi-
vidual is brought unlawfully into the United States at a young 
age to reunite with a citizen parent and builds a life here, only 
to be removed later? 
Concerns over the potential creation of a circuit split and re-
sultant gamesmanship are also unwarranted. As demonstrated 
in Part II.C, the reasoning underlying the Fifth Circuit’s reading 
of § 1432(a) has weaknesses. However, even if the Fifth Circuit 
persists with its current reasoning and does not reverse itself, 
 
 254 See Alexandra Jaffe, Perry in Spotlight as Texas DREAM Act Scrutinized (CNN, 
Apr 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6ANK-YXLX. 
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differing interpretations across the circuits would not prompt 
gamesmanship. Even if one circuit’s interpretation of the law 
suddenly became friendlier to unlawful entrants, new undocu-
mented immigrants would not flock there, because § 1432(a) 
does not apply to them. Further, § 1432(a) stopped applying to 
new immigrants in 2000, and the population to whom it applies 
is growing older. The practical costs of uprooting one’s life may 
outweigh the advantages of moving to a jurisdiction in which 
one has a stronger citizenship claim. This is particularly true be-
cause in practice, this issue is litigated only when a person is be-
ing removed. Individuals will in all likelihood not seek removal 
solely as an opportunity for courts to declare them to be citizens, 
because the risk of removal far outweighs the reward of coming 
forward. As such, the actual number of individuals to whom 
§ 1432(a) applies is likely very small, and correspondingly, the 
negative effects of a circuit split would be minimal. 
CONCLUSION 
Immigration remains a political and policy challenge in the 
United States. Ambiguities in the law create uncertainty for 
immigrants (both lawful and undocumented), their families, and 
their social networks. In particular, the circuit split over the 
meaning of the now-repealed derivative citizenship statute and 
the question of a lawful entry requirement remain unresolved. 
The text of § 1432(a)(5) does not speak clearly to the exist-
ence of a lawful entry requirement, and the legislative history is 
unavailing. However, both the text and legislative history can 
easily accommodate an interpretation that there is no lawful en-
try requirement, and the immigration rule of lenity suggests err-
ing on the side of citizenship rather than removal. To complicate 
matters further, overriding purposes of US immigration policy 
cut in both directions on the matter. On the one hand, citizen-
ship for individuals who have entered unlawfully flies in the face 
of basic fairness concerns and appears to reward bad behavior. 
On the other hand, the evidence suggests a significant policy 
preference for family preservation and lenity in interpretation of 
statutes insofar as they concern the children of naturalized citi-
zens. A Chevron analysis is unavailing, as the relevant agency 
has not spoken directly to the matter after confronting the ques-
tion. Finally, the statute’s repeal and replacement do not offer a 
clear resolution. 
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In the face of such ambiguity, what are courts to do? This 
Comment argues that because traditional interpretive method-
ologies have failed to answer the question definitively, courts 
should decline to find a lawful entry requirement. This allows 
the court system to address an issue of public importance with-
out exceeding its institutional authority. Courts following this 
approach would not be violating a textual command, as no such 
command exists. Furthermore, given that the class of individu-
als whose status could change as a result of this approach is lim-
ited and decreasing, this reading does not create the perverse 
incentives that would exist if the group were open to new mem-
bers. While courts should not reach beyond their constraints to 
legislate from the bench, this is not a situation that poses such a 
problem. Here, courts have an opportunity to promote family 
stability and individual welfare, all in a way that lies within the 
text of a statute. 
